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iAbstract
Collective Sanctions: an experimental approach
by Philipp Chapkovskii
This dissertation tests the efficiency of collective sanctions as a preventive
measure experimentally with three different cases: (i) collective sanctions
and the production of public good; (ii) collective sanctions and intergroup
cooperation, and (iii) collective sanctions and peer punishment. The disser-
tation demonstrates that in all three cases the functionalist hypothesis of a
potential efficiency of collective sanctions does not find empirical support.
In the first chapter, I test if sanctions applied to an entire group for the
free-riding of one of its members can increase the level of cooperation within
that group. To measure the efficiency of such collective sanctions, I con-
ducted a lab experiment based on a standard public good game. The results
show that overall, collective sanctions are inefficient. Moreover, when sub-
jects are able to punish their peers, the level of cooperation is lower in the
regime of collective sanctions than under individual sanctions.
The second chapter tests whether collective sanctions applied by out-
group members result in higher intergroup cooperation, and whether the
introduction of collective sanctions increases the amount of ingroup punish-
ment. The results demonstrate that neither of these two functionalist argu-
ments come true: participants avoid using collective sanctions against out-
groups, and the amount of ingroup (third-party) punishment is no higher
under the intergroup collective sanctions regime. As a result, the introduc-
tion of intergroup collective sanctions does not result in the higher degree of
intergroup cooperation.
The third chapter analyzes how the introduction of collective sanctions af-
fects the willingness to punish norm violations. I conducted a lab experiment
in which participants can choose to take money from a charity. After having
taken their own decision, they can observe the decisions of others, and can
decide to punish them. The results demonstrated that collective sanctions
significantly increased the frequency of peer punishment. However, this in-
creased rate of punishment did not go along with lower crime rates.
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1Introduction
In 2002, the Russian margarine and oil producing company Efko, which
owns vast territories of agricultural land in southern Russia, introduced a
new motivational system for farmers. Efko decided to institute this system
to motivate rural Russian farmers to work more efficiently and with better
morale. The system’s main characteristic was a focus on collective liability
of workers; it was introduced after running a series of sociological and psy-
chological tests in Russian villages. Workers’ efficiency was measured at the
group level; any kind of work ethics violation (e.g. absenteeism, working
while drunk, destruction of tools, etc.) brought punishment on the entire
team, not just the individual. Thus, in concrete terms, all rule violations re-
duced the earnings of the entire group of farmers.
In an interview for a business journal, the CEO of Efko explained the logic
behind these practices:
“We try to create socio-economic relations that would include a person into the
collective. Of course, a peasant should get enough money for normal life. But at the
same time, people around him should be dependent on the result of his labor. The
most effective guarantee of his efficiency is not the amount of money he gets, but the
reaction of others. As soon as I start working badly, that affects everybody around
me. And that’s the factor that guarantees my efficiency much more than money. For
my neighbor Vassia, what matters is to know that I care about Vassia’s wellbeing.
And I know that if I don’t care about his wellbeing he will take an awl and will
correct me. Our system is a mix of individualism and interdependency, of checks
and balances.” (Hisamova, 2002).
2 Introduction
This quote is highly illustrative of the main points that I am going to make
in the course of this thesis. I focus on the mechanism that moves the empha-
sis from the individual consequences of someone’s actions towards a group-
based incentivization tool. What happens if one’s individual actions may
have consequences on the well-being of others?
According to current literature, we define the transfer of negative con-
sequences for individual actions to the entire group as collective sanctions
(Heckathorn, 1988; Levinson, 2003), collective liability (Pettit, 2007), or col-
lective punishment (Pereira et al., 2015). These terms are largely interchange-
able. The definition of collective sanctions is seen as intuitively clear, so much
so that one of the two existing sociological papers on this topic does not even
provide a formal definition of the phenomenon (Heckathorn, 1988). The sec-
ond paper uses a definition borrowed from the pedagogical manual “Strate-
gies for Managing Behavior Problems in the Classroom,” in which collective
sanctions are defined as a practice in which “consequences are applied to
the group contingent upon each member reaching a specified level of perfor-
mance” (Whitmeyer, 2002). A recent psychological paper that studies differ-
ent student groups’ reactions to collective punishment for plagiarism defined
collective punishment as “the negative treatment inflicted by authorities or
by an outgroup upon an entire social group, in reaction to an offense commit-
ted by one or some of its members” (Pereira et al., 2015). This thesis employs
a definition given by the legal scholar Daryl Levinson in his comprehensive
review of the legal side of collective sanctions: “Sanctions are collective when
they are threatened against or imposed on groups of two or more individu-
als” (Levinson, 2003).
Collective sanctioning for individual norm violations is perceived by many
as a hallmark of authoritarian or colonial regimes. Whittaker (2015) said,
“The colonial authorities believed that the use of collective punishment was
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an appropriate method of dealing with its African population due to a be-
lief that stock theft was a socially accepted form of accumulation in African
societies. Policing and punishment could therefore be extended to the fam-
ily, village or entire location of the individual(s) implicated in a crime” (645).
Collective sanctions were also widely used by the Nazis in their crackdown
against local populations during World War II (Mannheim, 2013, p.50). The
UK authorities used their Collective Punishment Ordinance against the Kenyan
population (Ibid., p. 49). Collective punishment was also applied by the
Israeli authorities in Palestine and by Pakistani authorities in Bangladesh
(Horvitz and Catherwood, 2009, p.89-90). In the Soviet Gulag, the underper-
formance of one member of a team negatively affected his peers’ evaluation,
resulting in decreased food rations for the team as a whole. This system of
collective responsibility (Russian: krugovaia poruka, literally frankpledge)
“extended social control beyond where Soviet authority could reach, giving
every member of a brigade incentive to keep their fellow prisoners in line”
(Barnes, 2011, p.80).
Indiscriminate violence and disjoint norms
Collective sanctions imposed upon a certain group by a state or a state-like
authority usually are not intended to propagate a specific norm for the ben-
efit of a group, but rather to control and subdue a subordinate population.
When the authorities prefer such a sanctioning regime to more subtle and
less provocative individual sanctions? Here it is important to distinguish
between disjoint and conjoint norms.
For collective sanctions to exist it is necessary to have at least two actors,
and at least one of them should be a collective entity. An actor external to
this entity should be the one who is authorized to apply sanctions to an entire
group. Since the collective sanctions are applied by someone who is not a tar-
get of the norms himself, in many cases the norms being enforced are disjoint
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norms (Coleman, 2000). The fact that a target and a source of sanctions are
unmatched, is one of the potential sources of failure of collective sanctions:
the norm these sanctions enforce can be non-beneficial for a group. If an ex-
ternal group imposes the control through violence it is not technically correct
to say that we are talking about norm establishment but rather a compliance
to the rule. An important case of such disjoint norm enforcement is when
violence is used by military groups upon the population living in a disputed
territory. In order to curb the resistance, detect and eliminate renegades and
stealthy supporters of an enemy belligerents often use violence over entire
villages instead of catching specific individuals. The seminal study (Kalyvas,
2006) has examined under what conditions the belligerent parties recourse
to indiscriminate violence instead of punishing selectively. The definition of
such a violence makes it similar to collective sanctions: “a type of violence
whereby the victims are selected on the basis of their membership in some
group and irrespective of their individual actions.” (Kalyvas, 2004).
Kalyvas determines four potential reasons why an external authority may
prefer using indiscriminate violence: truncated data, ignorance, institutional
constraints and cost. First three explain its existence mostly by error or as an
unintended by-product of other decisions (such a way how decision-making
process is organized within the authority). Kalyvas believes however that
the main reason for indiscriminate violence is cost: “Identifying, locating,
and "neutralizing" enemies (and their civilian collaborators) one by one re-
quires a complex and costly infrastructure.” This cost that prohibits a proper
individual investigation, arises according to Kalyvas from the information
asymmetry: paramilitary groups who are not rooted in a territory do not
know who exactly can be a defector: “Enemies can be hidden among the
apparently supporters of a community, and contenders can only deal with
such informational problems in efficient ways by exercising violence against
previously selected defectors”.
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However collective punishment is not only characteristic of military or
authoritarian operations against peaceful populations; we can easily observe
this practice in numerous everyday practices. One obvious example is in
sports: FIFA regularly imposes closed-door sanctions, denying all of a club’s
fans the privilege to watch a game at a stadium if one of them has committed
racist offenses. For instance, one of the largest Russian soccer teams, CSKA,
in 2014 received the biggest anti-racism punishment in UEFA’s history when
some of its fans shouted racial offences. As a result, no CSKA fans were
admitted for two away games, and three home games were played in an
entirely empty stadium (Ellingworth, 2014). In her comprehensive overview
of collective sanctions in NFL, Peterson, 2012 provides an example of the
Pittsburgh Steelers, who accumulated 101 penalties in 2011, all incurred by a
single player.
Beyond sports, Peterson, 2012 also cites the US’ “One Strike and You’re
Out” eviction policy, which gives housing authorities the right to evict an
entire family if any member of the household or even a guest participated in
certain criminal activities, such as drug peddling. This same type of logic ap-
pears in recent prohibition legislation in the Indian state of Bihar, where there
can be a criminal case brought up against all adult members of a household
if just one member is suspected of consuming alcohol (“Bihar’s law” 2016).
Schools also commonly use collective sanctions. Teachers often give an
entire class detention when only one student misbehaves, and, as we saw in
one recent Manhattan school, an entire student body can bear the punish-
ment. In 2010, a Manhattan principal banned all 2445 students from using
toilets for the entire day because of the fight that happened the day before
(Schuck, 2010). Even more examples of collective sanctions in schools can be
seen in Whitmeyer, 2002 and Piaget, 1965.
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In the United States, collective punishment is also used in juvenile deten-
tion facilities and military boot camps (Heckathorn, 1988). In a large, first-
hand witness report of recent military practices in the US Army, the author
notices, “You must act like everyone else. You must perform like everyone
else. If you don’t, you will be punished. Or worse, the group will suffer
for your mistakes” (Mockenhaupt, 2007). The homogeneity of armed forces
and soldiers’ obedience to the rules are mostly achieved via group sanctions:
“The threat of collective punishment for individual infractions is one of the
most powerful motivators in military training” (Ibid.) Mockenhaupt tells the
story of his own experience with collective sanctions in the military:
“One night as we slept, just a few days into our training, two recruits left the
barracks and walked toward town, looking for a convenience store. A drill sergeant
driving home picked them up a short distance from the barracks. We were awakened,
told what had happened, and told we would be dealt with later. We fell back asleep
knowing the morning would bring pain. ‘So you want to play games?’ one of our
drill sergeants said. ‘OK, we will play games.’ He ordered us to squat and hold out
our arms. The two recruits stood in front of the formation, watching us and looking
sheepish. ‘Don’t be mad at me; be mad at your friends standing up here,’ the drill
sergeant said. < · · · > "I want you to be pissed at your friends. They did this to
you. They don’t want to be part of the team.” (Ibid.)
Collective sanctions are also used in business. The method of group mo-
tivation described by the Russian CEO above is not novel: a wide range of
management literature recommends linking bonuses not to individual per-
formance of an employee but to the team-level Key Performance Indicators
(KPIs) (Kerrin and Oliver, 2002; Bamberger and Levi, 2009).
Collective sanctions have been studied academically mainly by legal schol-
ars and psychologists and not so much by sociologists. Legal scholars typ-
ically examine the efficiency of collective sanctions in crime deterrence. In
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their opinion, collective sanctions can be of practical use because team mem-
bers can be “in an advantageous position to identify, monitor, and control
responsible individuals, and can be motivated by the threat of sanctions to
do so” (Levinson, 2003). Legal theorists have discussed whether this practice
should be extended to other areas, such as leveraged sanctions to prevent cor-
porate fraud in accounting (Velikonja, 2011) or fiduciary duty cases (Ibrahim,
2008).
Moreover, collective sanctions de facto exist in American jurisprudence:
for example, the Pinkerton liability rule states that members of a criminal
conspiracy are responsible for each other’s crimes committed during the con-
spiracy. Levinson, who produced the most comprehensive legal analysis
of collective sanctions in the United States, treats any form of vicarious re-
sponsibility as collective sanctions, including, for instance, corporate liabil-
ity, which imposes the responsibility for the torts of corporation employees
upon shareholders of the company (Levinson, 2003, p.362-371).
The strong association of collective sanctions with military actions and
oppressive regimes repelled many sociologists from paying more attention
to this phenomenon. That may explain the relative scarcity of sociological
literature on this topic. There are two main theoretical sociological papers
which analyze collective sanctions. A paper by Heckathorn, 1988 focused on
group size and internal cohesion as the main predictors of the efficiency of
collective sanctions. He argues that if a group is large and cohesive enough,
the implementation of collective sanctions will bring about a riot against the
central authority deemed to be unfair, instead of higher compliance. Later on
Heckathorn (1990) returns to this topic in his follow-up paper which focuses
on preferences of actors and how they affect the efficiency of different group-
based incentives.
In this paper Heckathorn develops a theory of a ’group-mediated social
control’. Regardless whether the incentives are negative (as it is in case of
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collective punishment), or positive (group-based rewards), any regime that
involves such a group-based incentive structure induces an additional peer
pressure. Heckathorn with his colleagues tested the effectiveness of such
peer-driven intervention on the adherence rate of HIV users (Broadhead et
al., 2002) with promising positive results. This method of group-based in-
centives suggested by Heckathorn was later used in a series of other field
experiments with mixed results. An experiment in Bolivia and Peru targeted
to increase conservational efforts of local farmers has shown that collective
rewards crowd out social norms aimed to protect nature without bringing in
positive results Narloch, Pascual, and Drucker (2012), while similar exper-
iments in Mexico and Tanzania demonstrated that collective rewards may
work if there is a certain amount of group cohesion and trust to a group
leadership Kerr, Vardhan, and Jindal (2012). Collective rewards as a mecha-
nism of creating peer pressure seems to have similar properties as collective
(negative) sanctions, but without a strongly negative reputation of the latter.
From that point of view using positive group rewards would be a better fit
for experimental design. On the other hand a potential or real loss suffered
by entire group or by a random member as a result of imposed collective
sanctions is not symmetrical to collective rewards if the main postulates of
prospect theory are valid Kahneman and Tversky (2013).
The second seminal paper, by Whitmeyer, 2002, explored an optimal com-
bination of individual and collective sanctions that would produce a higher
level of compliance for a minimum cost. He discovered that an optimal so-
lution is always a corner one: one should not mix individual and collective
sanctions to attain the best result. To date, there have been only three ex-
perimental papers on collective sanctions, one of them unpublished, offering
empirical evidence: Dickson, 2007, Fatas, Morales, and Ubeda, 2010, and
Yefeng, Jiang, and Villeval, 2015. (see their description in more details in
Chapter 1).
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Psychologists have not shied away from investigating the individual per-
ceptions of collective sanction regimes. Interest in these questions can be
traced back to the 1930s when Jean Piaget studied collective sanctions in a
school classroom environment. In a vignette experiment, 60 children eval-
uated three distinct types of collective sanctions: “1. The adult does not
attempt to analyze individual guilt and punishes the whole group for the
offence committed by one or two of its members. 2. The adult wants to dis-
cover the transgressor, but the latter does not own up and the group refuses
to denounce him. 3. The adult wants to discover the transgressor but the lat-
ter does not own up and the group is ignorant of his identity” (Piaget, 1965,
p.232). In each situation, every child had to estimate how fair it was to imple-
ment collective sanctions on the entire group and express why. Piaget found
that most children did not support the idea of collective sanctions. Accord-
ing to Piaget, in order to support collective sanctions a person’s preferences
should meet two necessary conditions: the strong belief into expiatory jus-
tice (“no misdeed could remain unpunished”) and group solidarity (“we are
ready to be punished to bear the suffering that our mate would bear”). The
younger kids (up to the age of 7 or 8) supported the first idea, but being ego-
centric, they lacked a feeling of group solidarity, whereas older kids (over age
8) had a strong feeling of solidarity but did not believe anymore in expiatory
justice.
Piaget’s experiments, as well as later studies, focused on group percep-
tions of collective sanctions, i.e. the question of the legitimacy and fairness
of such measures. Although this approach does not measure behavioral
changes due to collective sanctions, it measures attitudes towards them. The
fairness of a specific sanction regime is of a crucial importance because the
feeling of an unjust punishment decreases willingness to cooperate and pun-
ish others, even if this strategy would be individually profitable from the
rational point of view.
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The early experiments of Piaget provided a basis for more recent psy-
chological experiments in the same vein. Pereira et al., 2015 presented to
subjects several vignettes, in which a teacher punishes the whole group that
worked on a project together for the plagiarism of one of the students. The
experimenter asked the subjects to evaluate the fairness of such a system. In
general, participants perceived it as unfair. Cushman, Durwin, and Lively,
2012 found that the legitimacy of collective sanctions is context-specific. In
their study of baseball fans, they discovered that, in certain situations, (e.g.
when baseball players of one team harmed a randomly chosen member of
another team for something that another member of opponent’s team did in
the previous round) collective sanctions were considered fair.
A particular type of collective sanctions, one which interests me specifi-
cally and sparked the inquiry presented in this thesis, is the cases in which,
rather than the whole group receiving punishment as a result of an individ-
ual’s misdeed, a randomly chosen member of the group is punished instead.
Here, it makes sense to return to Levinson’s definition of collective sanctions.
He mentions that: “Collective should be understood in an ex ante sense, to
take account of the fact that sanctions directed against a single group mem-
ber chosen at random will have the same expected disutility for all group
members as sanctions divided evenly among all group” (Levinson, 2003).
Thus, according to Levinson, if an individual punishes a random member
of another group instead of punishing the person who is guilty in a certain
harmful action, we also deal with a subtype of collective sanctions.
Social psychologists have a long history of studying this displaced ag-
gression or vicarious retribution, a punishing behavior that targets not the
perpetrator but rather someone else from the same group. We may talk about
vicarious retribution when it is “directed at outgroup members who, them-
selves, were not the direct causal agents in the original attack against the per-
son’s ingroup” (Lickel et al., 2006). The term displaced aggression was first
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developed by Dollard et al., 1939 in their study of aggression, and since then
has been studied in dozens of psychological papers (see Marcus-Newhall et
al. 2000 for a meta-review). As psychological studies, they focus on the indi-
vidual motives and effects of such revenge, rather than on reasons and con-
sequences such behavior may have at the group level (one of the rare excep-
tions from such ontological individualism is Lickel et al. 2006). Psychologists
have outlined several major factors guiding the displaced revenge, includ-
ing strong ingroup identification and outgroup entitativity (Stenstrom et al.,
2008; Gaertner and Schopler, 1998).
This dissertation studies collective sanctions from a sociological perspec-
tive. This perspective takes the collective sanctions as granted, leaving out
the question whether their application is morally or legally justified which
is the subject of interest mainly for legal scholars (Levinson, 2003) or moral
philosophers (French, 1987). At the same time it goes beyond purely indi-
vidualistic point of view (an approach used by social psychologists such as
Pereira et al. (2015) or Cushman, Durwin, and Lively (2012)), trying to ob-
serve whether the threat of collective sanctions affects cooperation, the main
building block of a human group (Homans, 2017).
The guiding line of inquiry is into what kinds of microsociological mech-
anisms are in action when we implement collective sanctioning. I examine
the effect of collective sanctioning on three different aspects of interpersonal
relations: cooperation within a group, cooperation between groups, and will-
ingness to punish peers for third-party norm violations.
Collective sanctions are a puzzling sociological phenomenon. They con-
tradict the traditional logic of punishment. Sanctioning norm violations in
general and crimes specifically is a second-order public good (Heckathorn,
1989; Fehr and Gächter, 2002a). This action results in higher cooperation
and less destructive egoistic activity of each member of a community, thus
it is considered beneficial for the entire society. Norm enforcement is not
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free: punishment of a wrongdoer is risky, associated with potential conflict
with the target of sanctioning, involves significant efforts and can be time
consuming. All these considerations prevent many people from being ac-
tively involved in norm enforcement even if they benefit from the environ-
ment where norms are strictly followed. Rational choice theory predicts that
no rational agent will enforce the norm, preferring that the others do that
for him. However, numerous studies have shown that this is not the case
(Nikiforakis, 2008; Balliet, Mulder, and Van Lange, 2011; Fehr and Gächter,
1999). People not only punish those with whom they had a direct experience
of non-cooperation or norm violation, but also they enforce the norm even if
they are bystanders who simply observe a norm violation that does not affect
them directly (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; McAuliffe, Jordan, and Warneken,
2015; Lergetporer et al., 2014; Nelissen and Zeelenberg, 2009). The reasons
for such an altruistic punishment can be inequality aversion, spite, or social
norms (Casari, 2005). But whatever guides the punisher, his aim is to harm
the target of punishment in order to change the status quo (such as the distri-
bution of income), or to influence the future course of actions of a perpetrator.
This is not the case however for collective or random sanctioning. By defini-
tion this kind of sanctioning does not affect the norm violator. Theoretically,
we should observe collective sanctions extremely rarely in day-to-day life,
but there is a wealth of practical and academic evidence that shows collec-
tion sanctions are widespread. In this dissertation, I examine the reasons for
this paradox.
In the three papers that constitute this thesis, I analyze what kind of con-
sequences collective sanctions may have on such group-level factors as co-
operation and norm compliance. I decided to focus more on behavioral di-
mensions of such a sanctioning regime. The reason for that is that other im-
portant aspects such as perceived fairness or an outgroup entitativity (that is,
the tendency to treat outgroup members as a non-distinguishable whole) are
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covered by previous psychological studies.
I begin with the level of cooperation within groups. In Chapter 1, I use
a voluntary contribution design also known as public good game (Ledyard,
1994) and adapt it for comparing the relative ingroup cooperation rate under
two regimes. In a standard public good game, each individual is provided
with an initial amount of money which he or she can privately consume or
invest into a group project. While the inputs to this collective project de-
pend on individual decisions, its profits are equally distributed among the
group members. This creates a tension between willingness to cooperate and
temptation to free ride while enjoing the benefits of inputs of others. This
simple design makes it an ideal baseline scenario to study group dynamics
which resulted in hundreds of studies in sociology and behavioral economics
(Zelmer, 2003). Collective sanctions by definition are applied upon the group
from outside: either by an external authority such as the state or by members
of another group. Chapter 2 focuses on collective sanctions applied by an ex-
ternal group (in contrast to the sanctions applied ‘from above’ in the previous
chapter). To imitate this in a lab, we needed a set of formal rules, of which
violations would result in collective sanctions. For this purpose, the standard
design has been adapted. Participants had to invest a certain minimum into
a group project. When they failed to do so (and were detected by a random
checking mechanism), the entire group suffered decreased payoffs. Many
theoretical arguments defending collective sanctions suggest that the sanc-
tions serve as a delegation mechanism, which would boost the willingness of
other members of the group to provide such a second-order public good as
peer punishment for non-cooperation. Despite these expectations, the invest-
ments to common project when individuals were able to punish their peers
under collective sanctions were scarcer than under individual sanctions. One
of the striking results of this paper is that collective sanctions are perceived
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as deeply unfair (although there is a significant gender difference both in be-
havior and perception). Thus, we can speculate that collective sanctions fail
due to the lack of legitimacy of such a regime: after all, people do not under-
stand why they should be punished monetarily if someone else has failed to
meet the minimum investment requirement.
But what if we introduce the ability to punish collectively members of
another group for an individual defection? This way of treating outsiders
is much more acknowledgeable because all of us have faced prejudice and
stereotyping. What effect the endogenous collective sanctions may have on
intergroup relations is a topic for the second chapter of this thesis.
The main issue with the intergroup cooperation is that most of the theo-
retical work points out that we should observe eminent intergroup conflict,
whereas in the real life, most groups co-habit peacefully and successfully co-
operate (Fearon and Laitin, 1996). This puzzle has been rarely considered
both empirically and theoretically. The seminal work by Fearon and Laitin
develops the functionalist explanation of the potential mechanism for how
intergroup cooperation appears. Collective sanctions are implicitly one of
the keystones in their system. According to their logic, the threat of collec-
tive sanctions from an outside group makes ingroup policing more effective.
The introduction of such an institute also solves several issues of norm en-
forcement among the outsiders, specifically the high cost of detection and
persecution. The higher chance for cooperation due to higher norm enforce-
ment then serves as a self-reinforcing mechanism; contact theory claims that
the experience of successful cooperation with the outgroup generates the in-
tention to cooperate in the future and decreases ingroup bias and outgroup
prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006).
Introduction 15
It must be stressed that collective sanctions is just one of many ways to re-
solve an intergroup conflict. There are numerous other mechanisms that sta-
bilize and appease the intergroup relations such as contact hypothesis (All-
port, Clark, and Pettigrew, 1954) or the idea that multiple loyalties that cross
cut social circles undermine the motivation for intergroup conflict (Simmel,
2010). The general idea behind all these mechanisms is the reconceptualization
of group categories (Schiappa, Gregg, and Hewes, 2005), or their decategoriza-
tion (Brewer, 1999). All these approaches can be a way more efficient than
collective sanctions, but before these methods are applied there should be
a certain pre-existing demand within groups to cooperate. The conditions
for these methods to succeed is a set of norms supporting such cooperation
and willingness to implement them (Forsyth, 2010, p.432). That makes the
situation with implementation of collective sanctions a bit different from the
suggested methods.
What if we are yet in the situation when groups do not meet the require-
ments posed by Forsyth for recategorization? In this case some methods like
collective sanctions can be helpful. Another problem with the approach of
blurring down the intergroup boundaries is that as it was proved the pres-
ence of intergroup competition increases the intra-group cooperation (Erev,
Bornstein, and Galili, 1993) so the downside of such deconflictization would
be a decline in overall cooperation rate.
In general, in the theoretical literature there is overwhelming pessimism
about the prospective for intergroup cooperation. In 1906, William Sumner
claimed that “loyalty to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for
outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without – all grow together, com-
mon products of the same situation” (Sumner, 2013), and recent work has
stated that the “the current and dominant view in the social and human
sciences (including psychology) is that hostile competition is a main driv-
ing force in intergroup behavior” (Stürmer and Snyder, 2009, p.6). There
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are two main theoretical explanations for why groups should be in conflict
with each other rather than to cooperate peacefully: the rational explana-
tion and the psychological explanation. Both schools of thought follow very
different logics but agree on the one point: the chances of intergroup cooper-
ation are slim (Wilson, 2015). The rational line of thinking claims that since
adjacent groups have to share the same territory, they compete for the lim-
ited resources and the only logical way to survive is to push competitors out
or to eradicate them completely (Gellner, 2008). The psychological line of
thought, dominated by social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel and Turner,
1979), states that the feeling of belonging to a group has an intrinsic value for
individuals. This feeling is created and reinforced through the mechanism
of estrangement from other groups, so even without any kind of competi-
tion for resources, in-group bias quickly appears. The second chapter tries to
empirically test Fearon and Laitin’s hypothesis of beneficial effect collective
sanctions may have on intergroup cooperation. For this purpose, a group
of six players were divided into two equal-size subgroups and the members
of each subgroups were matched in pairs with out-group members. They
first played a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, after which they could observe the
decisions of another matched pair and took a decision on third-party pun-
ishment. In the Collective Sanctions treatment, the punishment applied to an
out-group member was randomly assigned to one out of three members. As
we shall see the introduction of collective sanctions decreased the coopera-
tion in Prisoner’s Dilemma game and substantially suppressed an out-group
punishment, proving that collective sanctions are deleterious for intergroup
cooperation despite Fearon and Laitin’s expectations.
Chapter 3 analyses how the introduction of collective sanctions affects
willingness to punish norm violations. In this lab experiment, people were
randomly matched in groups of two and had to make decisions first in a bi-
nary Dictator game towards a charity. If they chose to take the money from
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the charity to increase their personal payoff, they were fined with a certain
probability. After that stage, they were also able to punish their peers for
making norm-violating choices and this punishment was costly. In the collec-
tive sanctions treatment, norm violation could result in a decreased personal
payoff for both members of a group. The results demonstrated that collec-
tive sanctions significantly increased the frequency of peer punishment, but
this did not serve as an effective deterrence mechanism enforcing the norm.
There was no significant difference in the amount of money withdrawn from
the charity between treatments. The difference in punishment behavior was
driven by the behavior of those who chose to violate the norms themselves:
while only 12% of the norm violators in individual sanctions punished their
norm-violating peers, the amount of those under collective sanctions grew
up to almost one third. This confirms the intuition that collective sanctions
increase the amount of ’spiteful’ punishment in a group because it provides
a punisher with an extra motivation. The collective sanctions also served as
a mechanism undermining social relations in a group: the unwillingness to
punish their peers “without substantial reasons” dropped when the regime
changes from individual to collective sanctions, while the fear of retaliation
increased.
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Chapter 1
Strike one hundred to educate one:
Can collective sanctions be
efficient?
Abstract
In this paper, we test if sanctions applied to an entire group for the free-
riding of one of its members can increase the level of cooperation within that
group. To measure the efficiency of such collective sanctions, we conducted
a lab experiment based on a standard public good game. The results show
that overall, collective sanctions are inefficient. Moreover, when subjects are
able to punish their peers, the level of cooperation is lower in the regime
of collective sanctions than under individual sanctions. Both outcomes can
be explained by a general disapproval of the collective responsibility for an
individual fault: in the post-experimental survey, an absolute majority eval-
uated such regimes as unfair. But although collective sanctions are not an
effective means to boost group compliance, there are nevertheless two in-
sights to be gained here. First, there are differences across genders. Under
collective sanctions, males’ level of compliance is substantially higher than
under individual sanctions while the opposite is true for females. Second,
there were intriguing differences in outcomes between the different regime
types. Under collective sanctions, a person who is caught tends to comply in
the future, at least in the short term. In contrast, under individual sanctions,
an individual “wrongdoer” decreases his or her level of compliance in the
next period.
Keywords: Collective sanctions, Public good game, Crime deterrence
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1.1 Introduction
In 2014 the Narxoz University in Almaty, Kazakhastan hired a new rector,
Polish economist Krzysztof Rybinski. His main task was to clean up the
overpowering corruption and fraudulent practices pervasive in the univer-
sity. Despite knowing that in the majority of post-Soviet universities there
was a wide-spread and severe lack of integrity, Rybinski was still shocked by
the level of corruption, cheating, and plagiarism that he encountered.
Among other bribery curbing measures, Rybinski introduced collective
sanctions: if any employee was caught behaving corruptly, he or she, plus
their superior were fired. As the rector explained, since instituting these col-
lective sanctions, there had not been another single case of bribery among
teaching staff. When asked whether this approach provided an incentive for
managers to provide cover ups for their subordinates, Rybinski answered
that if a manager reported the misdeed, he or she was protected from the
punishment, meaning there was no incentive to lie on behalf of employees
(Matthews, 2016).
Even if collective sanctions may be an efficient measure to prevent certain
kinds of criminal actions, their usage goes against the entire logic of modern
justice, which is based on the idea of retribution. As Kant states, “judicial
punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote some other
good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead it must in all
cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has committed a crime”
(cited by Ross 1975, p.54).1
Advocates of collective sanctions usually justify them with two different
lines of argumentation (Peterson, 2012, p.169). First, the other group mem-
bers are guilty of negligence. They had a chance to prevent an antisocial
1For further philosophical discussion of collective sanctions and punishment see Corlett
1992.
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action by a team member, but they preferred to stay idle. So collective sanc-
tions are, in reality, individual sanctions for omission. This is an attempt to
solve the conflict between an idea of punishing the collective and Kantian
idea of retributive justice, which assumes only individual responsibility for
a criminal action. Since idleness in correcting a team member’s behavior is
treated as antisocial action itself, collective sanctions are intended to correct
inaction and to increase the amount of peer control.
The second argument follows a radical consequentialism, or a rational
cost-benefit analysis: it does not matter that group members are not directly
guilty in antisocial actions of the specific member but punishing collectively
is warranted on the grounds of efficiency. As Levinson, 2003 stated in his
overview of collective sanctions: “Group members might be punished not because
they are deemed collectively responsible for wrongdoing but simply because they are
in an advantageous position to identify, monitor, and control responsible individuals,
and can be motivated by the threat of sanctions to do so.” (p. 348). This logic is
built upon the idea of delegation of responsibility by an outside authority.
If the entire group is punished for the misdeed of one member, it becomes
the individual members’ task to detect and prevent antisocial behavior. The
positive consequences of delegating the responsibility to detect and prevent
crime on the nearest neighbors of a perpetrator outweigh the harm brought
by punishing an innocent.
In both cases the conclusion is the same: the introduction of collective
sanctions converts the task for an outside authority to find a wrongdoer (a
free-rider in case of a public good setting) into the task of his/her peers to de-
tect, prevent and punish the perpetrator. This paper examines what kind of
consequences collective sanctions have on cooperation within a group, and
on the willingness to punish uncooperative behavior by peers. Thus, the
main objective of this paper is to answer the following question: Can col-
lective sanctions for an individual’s antisocial behavior be beneficial for
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cooperation?
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review the current lay
of the land in the study of collective sanctions. In Section 3, I describe my
experimental design. In Section 4, I present results and analysis from the
experiment. Finally, in Section 5 I conclude and offer suggestions for further
inquiry.
1.2 Theoretical considerations and empirical evi-
dence
By definition, collective sanctions (CS) are imposed on an entire group for a
crime or misbehavior committed by a single member of that group. Pereira et
al., 2015 define CS as “the negative treatment inflicted by authorities or by an
outgroup upon an entire social group, in reaction to an offense committed by
one or some of its members”. It is usually traced back to pre-modern or prim-
itive societies where it was a key concept of law. Berbers for instance project
an idea of ’guilt’ for murder upon the nearest relatives of the murderer: “if
a homicide takes place, the ten closest agnates of the offender are immedi-
ately at risk because they are equally ’culpable’”(Gellner, 2000, p.376). It is
possible to erroneously come to conclusions that in modern life collective
sanctions are limited mostly to military bootcamps and prisons (cases men-
tioned by Heckathorn 1989 and Whitmeyer 2002 in their theoretical works on
CS). But in fact, many policy makers across the globe are proponents of this
measure.
Policy makers face the problem that resources to enforce the law are lim-
ited. The logic of CS is to delegate the power to detect norm violators down-
wards to the group members, and to grant them the authority to deal with a
wrongdoer themselves.
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For instance, after the democratic revolution in 2014, the new Ukrainian
government had to deal with the flagrant corruption in the customs service.
On May 17th, 2016 the newly appointed head of Customs Service, Hennadi
Moskal, wrote on his Facebook page: “Today, the shift foreman of customs at
the Ukrainian-Slovak border was caught by us in a bribery. . . For 420 Euros,
he promised to let some smugglers with cigarettes go. Last week at a meeting
with all the heads of the customs offices I promised: if anyone will be caught
accepting bribes, I will discharge the entire shift. So in our case, for 420 Euros,
one bribe-taker ruined his career, and the career of all his subordinates. We
will do the same with other bribe takers.”2
Another area in which collective sanctions are widely used is the school
system. Teachers often give a detention to an entire class when only a few
misbehave. One recent and eyebrow-raising example of a collective sanc-
tion happened in 2010 in a Manhattan school, where the principal banned
all 2,445 students from using toilets for the entire day because of a fight that
happened one day earlier (Schuck, 2010).
The belief that collective sanctions can be successful in curbing norm vio-
lations is common not only among policy makers, but also among academics.
For instance, in a review of solutions to collective action dilemmas, CS are
listed as a tool to boost informal control in a group: “A common control tech-
nique is to punish the whole group for some act committed by one of its
members. If the punishment is severe, as it often is, this technique may be
horrendously effective” (Monahan and Walker, 2011).
But if CS are widely used, or at least recommended by policy makers, do
they produce those beneficial effects on individual behavior? And why do
they do so?
There are some theoretical suggestions that collective sanctions, under
certain conditions, indeed can increase individuals’ willingness to cooperate,
2https://www.facebook.com/hennadii.moskal/posts/922829371195440
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or, vice versa, deter people from free-riding and non-cooperation. Following
Nakao and Chai, 2011 work on collective punishment, these arguments can
be divided into functional, preferential, and informational arguments.
First, the functional argument, central to the logic of CS, claims that the
introduction of collective sanctions increases the efficiency and willingness
of other group members to conduct ingroup policing.
Some authors consider the internal control capacity affected by collective
sanctions as the only factor that can make CS effective. One strand of re-
search is rooted in the rational choice literature and cites pragmatic reasons
for group members to react to CS. In Heckathorn’s model, “group members
have incentives to urge one another to seek out external sources of rewards
and to comply with external dictates to avoid triggering externally induced
punishments” (Heckathorn, 1990, p.367). Another argument is rooted in so-
cial identity theory, which explains cooperation and norm compliance by the
commitment of an individual to the group he feels he belongs to (Tajfel, 1982).
People tend to cooperate more with their own group members and the costly
punishment of group members for norm violation is itself a second-order
public good. If a person strongly associates him/herself with the group, that
increases the so-called black sheep effect, which is the tendency to punish
their own group members more severely than outsiders (Marques, Yzerbyt,
and Leyens, 1988; Shinada, Yamagishi, and Ohmura, 2004). Collective sanc-
tions, by producing a common experience for the group, increase group co-
hesion, resulting in a larger ’black sheep effect’ and increased propensity to
punish norm violators.
Second, collective sanctions may work because they change the prefer-
ences of a wrongdoer him/herself. The introduction of CS can be more effec-
tive than individual sanctions, because of the additional punishment brought
upon the other members of the group. The total ‘amount’ of sanctions that
may be assigned is thus higher under CS. If a wrongdoer cares about the
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suffering of others, the prospect of causing them to be punished may deter
him or her to engage in the devious action in the first place. For example,
the tradition of mutual exchange of hostages in some tribes guarantees that
a member fulfills the contract, otherwise his kin can be harmed.
Third, the informational argument states that for an external authority,
it is hard to detect who is guilty of an antisocial act, but for ingroup mem-
bers, this task is relatively cheap and attainable. So collective sanctions will
increase the detection rate by group members, the argument goes, while the
punishment itself can still be carried out by an external group. Thus, col-
lective sanctions address the information asymmetry that exists between in-
group and outgroup members.
Where does the field stand in terms of empirical research on collective
sanctions? Richard Posner starts his essay on the economics of collective
sanctions by describing them as “a conventional legal tool that is efficient
in many of its applications” (Becker and Posner, 2009). To-date, this and
related claims have not yet been thoroughly tested empirically: to the best
of my knowledge, there have only been three lab experiments on collective
sanctions. In an unpublished paper, Dickson (2007, p.5) claims that his study
“appears to be the first lab experiment involving collective punishment”, and
in their paper on random sanctioning, Fatas et al. claim that, “As far as we
know, no experimental analysis of random punishment in teams has ever been done”
(Fatas, Morales, and Ubeda, 2010, p.360).
Dickson’s 2007 study is similar to the one presented in this chapter. In his
paper, participants engaged in a standard public good game, where players
chose how much money to invest in a group project. One of five group mem-
bers was randomly assigned the role of “central authority” and was able to
punish other group members collectively. In one of two treatments, the in-
terest of the central authority was aligned with the interest of the group: his
or her earnings increase with the amount invested in a group project. In the
26 Chapter 1. Can collective sanctions be efficient?
other treatment, the interests of the group and that of the enforcer opposed
one another. Dickson found that collective sanctions had a subtle, short-lived
positive effect on cooperation in the case of aligned interests, and a strictly
negative effect in the case of opposed interests. However, the design also
suffered from some weaknesses, namely the fact that the principal was part
of the group, that the cost of punishment varied across treatments, and that
there was a 100% probability of detection. Arguably because of these weak-
nesses,punishers tried to avoid using collective sanctions, leading to an over-
all very low frequency of punishment.
Fatas, Morales, and Ubeda, 2010 provide an additional angle on collective-
sanctions-testing in the lab. In their experiment, a randomly chosen member
is punished by exclusion from the group (and from getting his/her share)
if groups are found to have low contributions. The participants found this
approach procedurally unfair, but it significantly boosted cooperation. The
authors do not treat their experiment as a study of collective sanctions, but it
is plausible to interpret it as such, as Levinson, 2003 does, writing: “[i]n gen-
eral, so long as groups are sufficiently solidary, group incentives will be the
same whether collective sanctions are lumped on one member of the group
chosen at random (or by any other criteria besides culpability) or spread
evenly among all group members” (p. 377). However, in Fata, Morales
and Ubeda’s 2010 design, the probability of exclusion grew linearly with
the number of violators, which made it rational for participants to cooper-
ate when the expected frequency of violations changed. In this sense, the
efficiency of collective sanctions was not tested by this design but was rather
implied by construction. Thus, their design does not allow us to disentangle
the effect of collective liability in and by itself on the efficiency of cooperation.
The most recent study by Yefeng, Jiang, and Villeval, 2015 focuses on the
effect of collective sanctions on corruption levels among bureaucrats. They
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used the same design as Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner, 2002, with one im-
portant amendment: If the number of corrupt bureaucrats exceeded a certain
threshold (in their case, there were two treatments with thresholds of 20%
and 60%), this triggered collective failure, which meant collective sanctions
and decreased payoffs for the entire group of bureaucrats. This threat was
not particularly effective; the risk of collective sanctions did not avert the
firms from offering a bribe and the number of officials who chose to accept it
(75%) was much higher than predicted.
The main aim of this paper is to test whether the introduction of collective
sanctions result in higher degree of cooperation, and how collective sanction
interact with peer punishment (that is, with the functional argument).
I design an experiment with a 2× 2 design. The experiment crosses the
institutional regime (individual vs. collective sanctions for a failure to invest
enough into a public good), with the presence or absence of ingroup policing.
1.3 Hypotheses
Collective sanctions affect the decision of an individual regarding free-riding
in the production of a public good in two different ways: directly and indi-
rectly. CS change the individual preferences directly by making norm viola-
tions costlier.
Norm violators incur a psychological cost (Abeler, Becker, and Falk, 2014;
Cohn, Maréchal, and Noll, 2015). As Nakao and Chai noticed, the knowledge
that someone else from the group will be punished for free-riding increases
the moral costs of such an action (Nakao and Chai, 2011).
On the other hand, when a collective sanction harms a cooperative per-
son, although that person did not actually free-ride, this produces a de-motivating
signal, and can result in unwillingness to cooperate later. The punishment
of a cooperator can be interpreted as an antisocial punishment (even if it
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was not intentionally so) (Herrmann, Thöni, and Gächter, 2008) and there is
plenty of evidence that such kind of punishment has a significant detrimen-
tal effect on cooperation, both when intentional (Fatas and Mateu, 2015), or
when generated by a noisy environment that does not allow the punisher to
correctly identify a free-rider (Grechenig, Nicklisch, and Thoeni, 2010).
The overall direct effect thus is unknown and depends on the degree of
group cohesion and the probability of being punished for the actions of oth-
ers, which, in turn, depends on the size of the group. Group cohesion has
a beneficial effect on cooperation because it assists a third-party monitoring
of norm violations and norm enforcement (Agrawal and Goyal, 2001). The
effect of group size in case of collective sanctions is more complicated. As
Heckathorn has shown in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the effective-
ness of collective sanctions grows with group size up to a certain point, and
then starts to decline because the chances to detect and prevent the crime in-
side a large group becomes smaller for an individual group member, while
the chance of being punished grows (Heckathorn, 1988).
The indirect effect of collective sanctions is a result of delegation and in-
creased ingroup policing. When possible, that is, CS should induce group
members to police each other, which will drive up cooperation rates. There-
fore, the institutional regime in which CS are applied should matter. The
institutional choice whether CS are applied or not should thus interact with
another institutional choice: whether peers are allowed to punish free-riders
or not. The indirect effect is believed to be a main mechanism that can explain
why collective sanctions should deter crime. It adjusts the information dis-
parity that an external authority has with regard to the perpetrator ((Becker
and Posner, 2009, p.303)), and makes people more inclined to deter their own
group members from injurious behavior (Becker and Posner, 2009, p.307). In
non-criminal cases, for example in the credit markets with third-party liabil-
ity, such as the Grameen bank program, each member in a group of people
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serves as a co-guarantor for everyone else in that group. That guarantees
mutual monitoring: “agents influence the other agents’ costs of engaging in
desirable and undesirable aspects” (Varian, 1990, p.155).
These considerations define the following hypotheses to be tested empir-
ically in the lab:
1. When peers are able to punish free-riders within their group, they will
do it more frequently and to a greater extent under the threat of collec-
tive sanctions rather than when there is merely a threat of individual
sanctions (IS).
2. Due to the expected larger extent of peer punishment under the regime
with collective sanctions and the ability of peers to punish free riders,
the level of cooperation will be higher here than in a similar regime
with individual sanctions (IS) only.
Under a regime of collective sanctions without peer punishment, there are
two concurrent processes going on: (1) the moral cost of free-riding grows,
encouraging cooperation, and (2) cooperators get punished, and thus are de-
motivated from further cooperation. So, there are two alternative hypotheses
to test under collective sanctions (CS) without ingroup policing, which we
will compare to a regime with individual sanctions (IS). Depending on which
of these two effects prevail, cooperation may either increase or decrease, and
may be higher or lower in CS than in IS:
3a. The level of cooperation under CS will be higher compared to the level
under IS because of the higher moral costs of free-riding.
3b. The CS regime sends mixed signals towards cooperators because they
can be punished while cooperating. This mixed signal can reduce their
willingness to cooperate in the future. So, under CS we shall observe a
lower level of cooperation than under IS.
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1.4 Experimental design
The basic framework of this experiment was a classic standard public good
game, which was played with and without peer sanctions, and with or with-
out the possibility of collective sanctions. This design is represented in the
2× 2 Table 1.1 along with the notations assigned to each treatment. I pro-
grammed all procedures using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007a).
TABLE 1.1: 2× 2 matrix of treatments
No Peer Sanctions Peer Sanctions
Individual Sanctions CP0IS0 CP0IS1
Collective sanctions CP1IS0 CP1IS1
The experiment consisted of 15 periods; treatments with peer sanctions
had three stages per period, and treatments without peer sanctions had two
stages per period. Participants were divided into groups of three and were
provided with an endowment of 20 tokens each. In Stage 1, they took de-
cisions how much to investment into a group project. In Stage 2, an exter-
nal check of individual contributions was performed; in Stage 3, participants
could use deduction tokens for peer sanctions.
The group composition remained fixed across all 15 rounds (partner match-
ing), but the identities of specific participants in a group were not revealed to
avoid retaliative strategic punishment or non-cooperation between rounds.
The first stage consisted of a standard public good game where individ-
uals face the choice of whether to cooperate or free-ride. This part was the
same for all four treatments, but the anticipation of possible consequences
at later stages may convince a person to contribute more or less at this stage,
depending on the institutional regime (CS or IS), and potential peer sanctions
at Stage 3.
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Stage 2 is the only stage where CS and IS treatments differed. Each group’s
contributions were checked with the same probability (1/3, more details are
provided below), but the consequences were different. In the case of individ-
ual sanctions, if a person did not meet a minimum threshold requirement,
and the external check revealed this, he or she bore individual consequences.
In contrast, in the case of collective sanctions the entire group’s payoffs was
reduced. The last, third stage appeared only in treatments with peer punish-
ment.
The utility function for the first stage coincided with Fehr and Gachter’s
stranger-treatment public good game (SPGG)
pii = y− gi + a
n
∑
j=1
gj
where y is the initial endowment, gi is the contribution to a group project,
n = 3, and 0 < a < 1 < na is the return on group project investment. An
investment multiplier of 0.5 was chosen, as this coefficient makes calculations
easier for participants.
To introduce an element of external authority that imposes collective or
individual sanctions on a group with a certain probability, I employed an
automatic mechanism that periodically controlled whether individual con-
tributions met a certain threshold. This threshold was set at half of the total
endowment: out of 20 tokens of endowment, 11 ’should’ be invested into
the group project. This prescribed number was not presented as the partici-
pants’ duty, and no morally loaded words (e.g. ’authority’ or ’punishment’)
appeared in the instructions. Instead, the participants were informed that,
with a certain probability, their contributions would be checked; if contri-
butions were found to be less than a set threshold, their earnings for that
particular period would be diminished – the exact text explaining this varied
according to the specific experimental treatment.
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The randomized checks were implemented as follows. I uploaded a ma-
trix of pre-generated random numbers from 1 to 100 onto the zTree server.
Each group had an associated vector of 15 random numbers drawn from this
matrix, one random number per period. In each period, if a number associ-
ated with this group and this period was less than 33, then the contributions
of an entire group were checked. Thus, the probability that a given group’s
contributions were checked was 1/3 in each period. This mechanism was
explained to participants in a simplified manner to make the explanations
clearer while avoiding participant deception. For example:
“In the second stage, there is a 33% chance that the contributions of ev-
eryone in your group are checked by a computer. Specifically, during every
period, the computer generates a random number between 1 and 100 for each
group. If the generated number equals or is lower than 33, then it checks the
contributions of all group members in that group.”
By pre-generating the numbers instead of generating them inside the ex-
periment, I was able to guarantee that in each treatment there were the groups
with the similar history of external controls. Since the order and frequency of
external checks influence the intentions of individuals to cooperate and pun-
ish the peers in subsequent periods, this design allowed me to control for a
history of ’checks’ in each of our four treatments.
The different regimes of sanctions were implemented in the following
manner. In the individual sanctions (IS) regime, if an individual’s contribu-
tion was found to be 10 tokens or less during the check, that participant’s
earnings for that period were reduced by 7 tokens. If the group’s contri-
butions were not checked, then all individual earnings just took home the
amounts they earned during that round.
Under the collective sanctions (CS) regime, if the contribution of at least
one group member was found to be 10 tokens or less during the check, the
earnings of everyone in the group in that period were reduced by 7 tokens.
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Therefore, after the second stage of checking, the profits of individual
members were
IP =

pii − F gi < T ∩ p < 13
pii gi > T ∪ p ≥ 13
CP =

pii − F gj < T ∩ p < 13
pii gj > T ∪ p ≥ 13
Where j ∈ 1 . . . n, CP is the profit under collective sanctions, IP is the
profit under individual sanctions, F = 7 is the fine if a contribution is less
than the threshold T = 11, and p is a random number between 0 and 1.
At Stage 3, in treatments with peer sanctions, participants were able to
send deduction points to the other members of their group, up to a maximum
of 10 deduction points for each of the peers. Each deduction token reduced
the recipient’s earnings by 2 tokens, while reducing a sender’s earnings by 1
token.
1.5 Game-Theoretical predictions
The expected amount of the fine imposed by a central authority if a subject
fails to invest above the necessary threshold of 10 tokens is calculated as the
probability of being caught (p), multiplied by the amount of the fine (F).
A net loss of investment of the threshold T is (1− a)T, where a is the rate
of return on investments to a common pool. So unless pF > (1 − a)T, a
rational profit-maximizer will behave in the same way s/he would behave
in a regime without a contribution threshold. The same logic applies in the
case when costly peer sanctions are introduced. These peer sanctions are a
second-order public good, so there is an incentive to free-ride in their produc-
tion. The purely game-theoretical (but not behavioral!) prediction therefore
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is that people do not make use of peer sanctions (As it is known from Fehr
and Gächter, 2002b or Herrmann, Thöni, and Gächter, 2008 people punish
their peers ignoring the rational profit-maximizing considerations).
Thus, under an individual sanctions regime, on average the same equi-
librium should be observed as in any other standard public good game with
peer punishment stage – no matter what kind of preferences the participants
have towards the peer sanctions: if participants expect that non-cooperative
behavior is punished by the peers, we shall observe the convergence towards
full cooperation, or if people fail to provide this second-order public good,
the cooperation will decline. When collective sanctions are applied an opti-
mal strategy depends on the size of j, an expected number of violators. Even
if the probability of a group being checked is the same as it was under in-
dividual sanctions, the chances to be sanctioned externally grow with the
expected number of wrongdoers. That is the reason why the efficiency of
collective sanctions drop with the growth of a group size Heckathorn, 1988:
as the group gets larger, so does the chances to be externally sanctioned. In
groups of a significant size under collective sanctions norm compliance is not
a viable strategy to avoid sanctions. The burden of being in such a group is
additionally worsened because an individual participant is in a less advan-
tageous position from the point of view of information: he or she may not
know who was an actual perpetrator so he feels helplessness, being punished
by an external force without being able to detect a norm violator who was a
cause of these sanctions. On the other hand, in smaller groups the intro-
duction of collective sanctions increases the probability of peer punishment
thus, we can expect the growth of norm compliance. Since the vectors of
these two mechanisms (lower cooperation rate in expectation of being pun-
ished even you cooperate and higher expectation rate due to expected peer
punishment) are oppositely directed, without specific parameters (such as a
group size and an expected frequency of norm violation) it is hard to give
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clear-cut theoretical predictions whether the equilibrium would differ from
an individual sanctions regime.
It is important to detail how we chose these exact parameters for a game.
The key factors that defined the game were p, F, and the cost of deduction
tokens cd. Since Fehr and Gächter, 2000 work on peer punishment, various
studies on SPGG have used cd = 3. As Carpenter, 2007b found, the demand
for punishment is inelastic and approaches zero for any price below 1. At the
same time, as Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008 analysis of the statics of pun-
ishment in SPGG showed, for cd = 3, the level of cooperation reaches almost
100% after approximately the 5th round, 0% for cd ≤ 1 (confirming Carpen-
ters findings), and remains stable at around 50% for cd = 2. If we would like
to see an effect (in whatever direction) of collective liability on contributions,
then cd = 2 appears to be a safe option because, as Nikiforakis and Nor-
mann’s paper shows, that is the price of punishment which makes roughly
half of the population to cooperate, thus resulting in the highest variability.
Finally, in regard to the group size, while n = 3 may be an unusual size
(SPGGs follow Fehr and Gachter, who chose n = 4), both lab studies (Car-
penter, 2007a) and a meta-analysis of 27 SPGGs (Zelmer, 2003) did not find a
significant effect of the group size on contributions or punishment levels.
1.6 Results
The experiment was conducted in the Columbia Experimental Laboratory in
the Social Sciences (CELSS) using the standard z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007b)
software. The design was approved by the Columbia University internal re-
view board, participants were recruited via the ORSEE online system. Before
proceeding with the experiment, all participants signed a consent form ac-
cording to the IRB protocol. Subjects received a guarantee that their decisions
as well as their payoffs would remain completely anonymous. In total, 108
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participants took part in the experiment during 8 sessions, which took place
between December 1st and 4th of 2015. The number of participants in each of
the four treatment groups is shown in Table 1.2. Instructions are available in
Appendix A, and screenshots of the z-Tree program are shown in Appendix
B.
TABLE 1.2: Number of participants per treatment
Treatment Peer punishment Collective sanctions Participants Observations
CP0IS0 No No 24 360
CP0IS1 Yes No 30 450
CP1IS0 No Yes 24 405
CP1IS1 Yes Yes 27 405
Total 108 1620
The average payment the participants received at the end of the experi-
ment was $22.00 (all currencies are US dollars), including $5.00 as a reward
for showing up. Earnings varied between treatments, being slightly higher
for individual sanctions ($22.40 vs. $21.70 in CS) and for treatments with-
out peer sanctions ($22.20 vs. $21.90), but statistically the difference was not
significant.
The dynamics of individual contributions into a group project show sim-
ilar patterns for the collective and individual sanctions regimes (Figure 1.1).
All participants started with high contribution levels of 10 to 12 tokens out
of 20. Without peer sanctions, cooperation began to decline after the 5th or
6th round to contributions of 5 or 6 tokens out of 20. This pattern echoes ob-
servations in other voluntary contribution experiments (see contributions in
baseline scenarios with no punishment in such studies as (Bochet, Page, and
Putterman, 2006; Page, Putterman, and Unel, 2005; Cason and Khan, 1999),
and is considered a common phenomenon explainable by strategic behavior
or learning (Andreoni, 1988).
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With peer sanctions, the average contributions remained relatively stable
at about half of the endowment (10-12 tokens) until the 15th (and the last)
round, when the contributions dropped – again, a typical effect of the ’end
game’ for other Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms (VCM) with sanctions.
When peer sanctions were available, CS contributions were lower than IS.
There was no such difference in CS and IS treatments without peer sanctions.
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FIGURE 1.1: Average contribution to the group account in each
period, by treatment
The subjects could choose t invest any nu ber of tokens (between 0 the
total endowment of 20) into a group project, with the safe threshold of 11
tokens, below which an external punishment could be applied. In reality,
their choice set was much more limited. 81% of contributions fell into one of
three categories:
1. 31% (502 observations) of contributions were 0, or total non-compliance;
2. 28% (456 observations) of contributions were 11, exactly ’at the edge’ of
compliance;
3. 22% (361 observations) of contributions were full cooperation of 20 to-
kens.
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This trimodal distribution provides an additional layer of analysis. When
rules define a threshold for bare minimum cooperation, a rule-follower has a
choice to be a marginal cooperator who contributes right above the necessary
threshold, or to voluntarily cooperate to a degree larger than required.
The patterns of cooperation/non-compliance with regard to a threshold
vary across the treatments (Figure 1.2). In general, CS again proves its inef-
fectiveness: the share of pure non-compliers (those who contribute less than a
threshold, gi < T) is higher under collective sanctions than under individual
sanctions. That is true for treatments both with and without peer sanctions.
Without peer sanctions, the percentage of non-compliers under CS is 51% vs.
47% under IS, and with peer sanctions non-compliers represent 36% under
CS vs. 31% under IS.
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FIGURE 1.2: Percentage of contributions below and above
threshold
Wh n we focus on thos contributions which met the requirements of 11
tokens or more only (that is, those who were either at the edge of compliance
or who were full voluntary cooperators), we observe diverging behavior be-
tween treatments with and without peer sanctions (Figure 1.3). Without the
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possibility of being punished by group members, the share of ’bare com-
pliers’ is lower under collective sanctions (only 53% of all compliers). The
behavior changes when we introduce peer sanctions; the number of volun-
tary cooperators is now higher (56% vs. 50%) in the individual sanctions
regime. Presumably, peer pressure makes people more reluctant to break the
minimal-contribution rule, but at the same time that “kills” their motivation
to fully cooperate above the mandatory level.
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FIGURE 1.3: Percentage of contributions above threshold only
Addition lly, there wer unexpected, but clearly visible, differen es in be-
havior between genders across treatments with peer sanctions (Figure 1.4).
There is currently no consensus in the literature about gender differences
in contribution levels in public good games. Some studies have found no
gender difference in con rib tions (Sell, Griffith, and Wilson, 1993; Andreoni
and Petrie, 2008), some have found that women contribute more (Seguino,
Stevens, and Lutz, 1996), and others have found that males contribute more
(Solow and Kirkwood, 2002). Still others find more nuanced effects, such
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as the observation that women contribute significantly more when the free-
riding option is intentionally framed as a harm to the rest of the group (Fuji-
moto and Park, 2010), or that women start with higher levels of contributions
– and effect that fades out over time, however (Cadsby and Maynes, 1998).
Balliet et al.’s 2011 large meta-review of more than 270 studies of social dilem-
mas points out that generally, there are no significant gender differences, al-
though men tend to be more cooperative in repeated interactions.
The two dominant theoretical frameworks in this area also have contra-
dicting predictions. First, the sociocultural theory explains the difference in
behavior across genders as differences in social roles and experiences that in-
dividuals sustain throughout their life course (Eagly and Wood, 1999; Eagly
and Wood, 2011). Since women, due to their social positions, develop more
interpersonal skills, they are more community-oriented and thus contribute
more and free-ride less in social dilemmas. In contrast, the evolutionary
paradigm assumes that the gender differences evolved as a result of adap-
tion to different problems in the course of evolution, namely mostly hunt-
ing for men, and gathering for women (Hawkes and Bliege, 2002; Silverman
and Eals, 1992). According to this line of thought, since hunting needs more
group coordination than gathering, men cooperate in social dilemmas more
than women.
These contradictory theoretical and empirical stances influenced the de-
cision not to include gender differences in behavior under collective sanc-
tions regimes in the guiding hypotheses. In the course of analyzing the re-
sults, though, important empirical contributions to this larger area of inquiry
emerged, and are thus included in the analysis and results section of this
paper.
It turns out that male subjects contribute less than female subjects in IS (on
average 10 tokens vs. 12 for females) and significantly more in CS (14 vs. 8,
or +75%). No such pattern is observed in treatments without peer sanctions
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(Figure 1.5). The same is true if we look only at the contributions above the
contribution-threshold. On average, under IS, the female participants who
decided to ’obey the rules’ invested 16 tokens, but invested only 12.8 tokens
under a CS regime. The situation is exactly opposite for males (13.8 under IS
vs. 17.0 under CS). The proportion of voluntary cooperators among females
in IS is 60%, but almost three times (22%) as low among males (see left plot
of Figure 1.6). The situation is the opposite under collective sanctions, where
64% women are “bare” contributors, compared to only 29% of males.Chapter 1 
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Figure 4. Contributions above threshold across gender   
A cross-sectional OLS (Figure 5) where the dependent variable was the average contribution 
of an individual across all 15 periods confirmed that the difference across genders is statistically 
significant at a 10% level for a treatment with a peer control. Males under collective sanctions 
contributed significantly more than females, even controlling for their estimations of fairness 
of the specific regime. As we shall see later, the fairness evaluations vary across genders 
substantially, and females find collective sanctions much more unfair, so the overall gender 
effect is even larger. Also, the low level of trust (a negative answer to the question Do you think 
that in general people can be trusted?) reduces the level of contributions. 
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A cross-sectional OLS (Figure 1.7) where the dependent variable was the
average contribution of an individual across all 15 periods confirmed that the
difference across genders is statistically significant at the 10% level for the
treatment with peer sanctions. Males under collective sanctions contributed
significantly more than females, even controlling for their estimations of fair-
ness of the specific regime. As we shall see later, the fairness evaluations
vary substantially across genders, and females find collective sanctions much
more unfair, so the overall gender effect is even larger.
We followed Gaechter and Renner, 2010 and Anderson and Putterman,
2006 for panel data analysis, running a random-effects Tobit regression and
random-effects panel OLS (both sets of models are shown in Tables 1.3 and
1.4, respectively). Tobit models are widely used for analysis of voluntary
contribution studies (see Solow and Kirkwood 2002) due to the fact that pos-
sible contribution levels are bounded from below and above, meaning that
ordinary OLS can be biased. The panel data analysis confirmed the cross-
sectional OLS results: again, males under the CS regime with peer sanctions
demonstrated significantly higher levels of contributions. This is observed in
the large and statistically significant effect of the interaction term ’CS X Male’
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which approximately twice outweighs the negative effect collective sanctions
have on the predicted level of cooperation.
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FIGURE 1.7: OLS regression. DV: Contribution, n = 108, 10%
CI
This gender-based behavioral difference in reaction to collective sanc-
tions can be explained by a gender-based difference in perception of the two
regimes. In a post-experimental questionnaire, we asked participants to eval-
uate the fairness of the specific sanctions rule used in the game. Fairness was
estimated by participants twice. First, they graded the regime they experi-
enced in the experiment using a four-level Likert scale (from “very unfair”
to “totally fair”). Next, we explained the rules of another treatment (collec-
tive sanctions to the participants of the individual sanctions regime, and vice
versa). Participants then had to grade the fairness of this alternative regime
compared to the one they just experienced. This doubled the number of esti-
mations (with all relevant limitations) and usefully put the evaluation of the
regime they had experienced into context.
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TABLE 1.3: DV: Contribution to the group project. Tobit
random-effect baseline and two extended models
DV: Contribution (1) (2) (3)
Collective sanctions (CS) -2.090 -6.202** -6.659**
(2.457) (2.891) (3.115)
Peer sanctions 3.977 4.616** 4.340*
(2.463) (2.347) (2.525)
Gender (male) -5.236 -6.162*
(3.440) (3.692)
CS X Male 11.24** 12.15**
(4.937) (5.297)
Trust -6.642*** -7.405***
(2.433) (2.621)
Peer sanctions receivedt−1 0.131
(0.173)
Peer sanctions sentt−1 0.524***
(0.183)
CS Appliedt−1 -1.492
(0.957)
Group is checkedt−1 2.030***
(0.701)
Sigma 8.208*** 8.209*** 7.804***
LL -3320.37 -3315.13 -2985.74
Wald 3.74 15.04*** 32.55***
Observations 1,620 1,620 1,512
Individuals 108 108 108
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
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TABLE 1.4: DV: Contribution to the group project. Panel OLS
(random-effect) baseline and two extended models
DV: Contribution (1) (2) (3)
Collective sanctions (CS) -0.698 -2.546* -2.551***
(1.172) (1.402) (0.965)
Peer sanctions 2.557** 2.858** 2.911***
(1.174) (1.139) (0.786)
Gender (male) -2.094 -2.358**
(1.678) (1.154)
CS X Male 5.032** 5.270***
(2.393) (1.646)
Trust -3.133*** -3.172***
(1.180) (0.812)
Peer sanctions receivedt−1 0.0177
(0.0893)
Peer sanctions sentt−1 0.193**
(0.0826)
CS Appliedt−1 -1.260***
(0.472)
Group is checkedt−1 1.185***
(0.350)
Sigma 4.579 4.579 4.358
R2 0.0297 0.0890 0.119
Wald 4.967 15.95 53.82
Observations 1,620 1,620 1,512
Individuals 108 108 108
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1
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While for IS there was almost no difference in the fairness evaluations
between males and females, for CS, females found the regime much more
unfair; the difference is statistically significant at a 10% level (see Figure 1.8).
Perception of the regime fairness appears to be a key factor that explains why
CS is not as efficient as it should be. The OLS coefficients of fairness on av-
erage contributions are both positive and statistically significant (Figure 1.9),
and this relationship is observed across treatments and different estimates of
fairness level.
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1.7 Different reactions to the external check
It could be expected that the previous experience of sanctions by a central au-
thority would affect participants’ behavior in the next round. This reaction
is observed in most iterated voluntary contribution experiments, like Bal-
dassarri and Grossman, 2011. The overall effect of an external sanctioning
regime can be split into two effects: one from being checked, and one from
being punished externally (conditional on one’s behavior being checked).
Control and punishment by an external sanctioning authority have very
different consequences under the collective sanctions (CS) regime as com-
pared to the individual sanctions (IS) regime. Under IS, if the entire group
is checked, a person does not bear the external sanctions as long as s/he did
not break the rules (in our case, s/he should have contributed more than 10
tokens). Therefore, the external control mechanism can confirm a person’s
prior beliefs that following the rule is the right decision. However, it may
happen that this can provoke the opposite reaction, due to the well-known
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gambler’s fallacy – individuals’ believe that an unlikely event becomes less
likely in the future when it has just materialized. This effect would provoke
a decrease of compliance during the next period. An illustrative analogy
would be ticket control on public transport. A person with a valid ticket, ob-
serving a ticket inspector, may either feel reassured that the purchase of the
ticket was the right decision, and that decision should be repeated because
ticket control is present, or, the next day, s/he would skip buying the ticket
because the chances that inspectors checking the same line two days in a row
are perceived as slim.
In the IS treatment, we thus may expect the effect of both sanction and
checks on future contribution levels to be ambiguous.
Under collective sanctions, however, the situation is different. Here, if
the members of a group get checked, but no one gets punished, this immedi-
ately implies that everyone in the group followed the rule. In the CS, being
checked without anyone getting punished is thus extremely rich in terms of
information. Returning to the train analogy, it would be similar to a situation
in which everybody else aboard knew that there is no fare-avoiding stow-
away in the entire carriage. In contrast, if the group is checked and punished,
this sends a diffuse signal. Someone in the group is free-riding, but it is not
clear who, but everyone nevertheless has to bear the consequences. We may
therefore expect punishment under CS to discourage future contributions.
In model 3 (Tables 1.3 and 1.4), we included lagged variables of the exter-
nal check at t− 1 and external sanctions at t− 1. These two lagged variables
work in opposite directions: if the group is checked, this increases the invest-
ment into a group project in the next period, but if it is checked and punished
the contributions drop.
Overall, out of 1,620 individual observations, 1,098 (67.78%) were not
checked, while 259 (15.99%) were checked without external sanctions, and
263 (15.23%) were checked and punished externally. Therefore, the groups
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were checked in 32.22% of the cases, which fits almost perfectly to a pre-
dicted 33% level outlined earlier.
Using two binary variables (“External check” and “External punishment”),
we constructed a new categorical variable in order to conduct a more fine-
tuned analysis. Theoretically, the variable can take 2× 2 values. A group can
be (1) “not checked, not punished”, (2) “checked, not punished”, (3) “checked
and punished”, and (4) “not checked and punished”. However, the last op-
tion is not realistically feasible option, leaving us with three, rather than four
distinct values.
The coefficients of “check, no punishment” and “check, punished” show
how deviations from the baseline scenario (no check, no punishment) during
the previous period influenced the contributions in the subsequent period.
We can see that that subjects reacted differently to external punishment and
checks under the two different regimes. Checks of already cooperative sub-
jects (in IS) or groups (in CS) increase cooperation in the next period, even if
barely so under IS.
In contrast, the effect of actually being punished goes in different direc-
tions for IS and CS. The external punishment of a non-cooperative subject in
IS causes his or her cooperation level in the next period to drop. In CS, exter-
nal sanctions of a non-cooperative group increase that group’s cooperation
in the next period.
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received a confirmation of their belief that this level of investment is the right strategy. Those 
who decided not to cooperate at t - 1, and who were fined individually for their non-
cooperativeness, supposedly believed that the chances of being checked twice in a row were 
negligible. The situation is different in CS regime. In this case, the previous experience (at t - 1) 
of being checked and punished increased compliance. Why does the same “lightning” logic not 
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the group is punished anyways, regardless of individual decision of a subject, making the 
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We can see that most of the mechanisms discussed above seem to be re-
flected in the data. In IS, subjects who i vested at t− 1 above the threshold
of 11 tokens, by being checked at t− 1, received a confirmation of their be-
lief that this level of vestme t is the right strateg . However, we can also
find evidence for the “lightning never strikes twice”-logic. Those who de-
cided not to cooperate at t − 1, and who were fined individually for their
non-cooperativeness, supposedly believed that the chances of being checked
twice in a row were negligible.
The situation is different under the CS regime. In this case, the previous
experience (at t − 1) of being checked and punished increased compliance.
That is, rather than being discouraged by the evidence of the presence of
free-riders, and lowering contributions, punishment actually causes contri-
butions to rise. Why does the same “lightning” logic not work here? One
possible interpretation is the diffused responsibility under collective sanc-
tions; the group is punished anyway, regardless of the individual decision
of a subject, making a strategic violation of the rule harder to calculate. We
may also speculate that the increased level of cooperation after the group is
punished can be due to Mechanism 1, which we mentioned above: that is,
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moral costs imposed on other group members. To draw such a conclusion,
we would need more data, however, because the effect of interaction term
“Peer sanctions X External sanctions” remains weak.
1.8 Collective sanctions and trust
The declared level of trust affects both the propensity to free-ride, and the
level of cooperation. Evidence for a positive correlation between trust and
cooperation comes from a study by Gächter, Herrmann, and Thöni, 2004.
They revealed this correlation in a large scale lab experiment in Russia, and it
has since been replicated many times – for a review of more than 200 studies
of this topic see a meta-review by Balliet and Van Lange, 2013.
In the present experiment, participants answered to the standard trust
question in a post-experimental survey. We used the formulation from the
World Values Survey, which states: “Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with
people?”, to which there are two possible answers. 40 out of 108 participants
(37.04%) chose the answer “Most people can be trusted”, while 68 (62.96%)
answered that you “Can’t be too careful”.
In the original formulation the ’Trusting’ answer comes first (no random-
ization of order is done), and coded as 0, and ’No trust’ answer is coded
as 1, thus in a later analysis negative coefficients in ’Trust’ factor should be
interpreted as positive effect of trust on a dependent variable.
Whether self-declaratory statements such as the trust question in WVS
match with the behavioral dimensions of trust are a question of debate. To
adjudicate in this debate, trust measured by survey responses is sometimes
compared to the decisions made in a trust game (with a sender and receiver).
Some previous studies have shown that the WVS measure correlates with
recipient’s behavior only (Glaeser et al., 2000), while others have shown the
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opposite (Fehr et al., 2003), or no correlation Thöni, Tyran, and Wengström,
2012, using large-scale experimental data (N = 1500) in Denmark, showed
that in a standard public good game, the average contributions of condi-
tional cooperators (i.e. those participants whose contributions correlate sig-
nificantly with the average level of contribution in their group) strongly cor-
relate with their answers on the WVS trust question.
The results of our study support the Thoni et al. study. Overall, the
contributions of self-declared trusting participants were 32% higher than no-
trusting ones (11 tokens vs. 8.3), and this difference is even larger (60% higher
or 10.5 vs. 6.5) if we look at treatments without peer sanctions, as in Thoni
et al. However, the introduction of collective sanctions eliminated this differ-
ence, and the differences in contribution levels become statistically insignifi-
cant.
The combination of these findings with gender shows that a lack of social
trust is negatively related to contributions among women in all treatments
but CP1IS1 It seems that their generally hostile reaction towards CS decreases
the cooperativeness even among the most “trustful”. No such association
was observed among men.
After the experiment, we showed the participants their average contribu-
tions over all 15 periods and asked how much, in their opinion, they would
have contributed under the alternative regime (that is, CS was shown to those
in the IS treatment, and IS to those in the CS treatment). In all cases, partici-
pants stated that they would have contributed more in the alternative treat-
ment than they did in their actual treatment (+2.8, S.E. 0.51). The most “re-
gretful” group were those who participated in the CS without peer sanctions.
On average, they would have preferred to invest 5.2 tokens more in the group
project under the alternative regime, S.E. 0.98).
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1.9 Peer punishment across treatments
This section analyzes how the use of peer punishment varied between the
different sanction regimes and different genders. We should note that due
to a relatively high cost of punishment (1 token per 2 deduction points), the
number of instances of peer punishment was quite low: out of 51 partici-
pants, only 33 ever used it, and did so in only 84 cases. This limits our ability
to draw statistical inferences by “traditional” methods, such as a panel OLS.
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reaction among women in all treatments but CP1IS1. No such difference is observed among 
men. The only case when both trustful and non-trustful women react equally is CS. It seems 
that their generally hostile reaction towards CS decreases the cooperativeness even among the 
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(+2.8, S.E. 0.51), but the most “regretful” group were those who participated in CS without 
peer sanctions (on average they would prefer to invest into a group project 5.2 tokens more than 
they did, S.E. 0.98). Presumably, this can be interpreted as a weak hint of the moral costs 
described previously, though not present in the experiment itself. 
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Initially, the dynamics of peer punishment are almost perfectly the same between CS and CS.  
In both IS and CS treatments with peer sanctions, the peer punishment dies out after the 7th 
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FIGURE 1.12: Peer p ishme t: gene al a across gender
Neverthele s, the patterns obs ved are intr guing. Init al y, the dynamics
of peer punishment are almost perfectly the same between CS and IS. In both
IS and CS treatments with peer sanctions, the peer punishment dies out after
the 7th round, having fulfilled its cooperation-stabilizing role. If we look
closely at the punishing behavior of males and females separately, we see two
rather different stories emerge, however. Males punish their group members
much more under collective sanctions, while females do so under individual
sanctions. We thus here have another piece of evidence that the different
genders react systematically different to the different sanction regimes.
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1.10 Conclusions and implications
Despite the positive evaluation by some policy makers, collective sanctions
do not seem to result in higher levels of group cooperation. The mechanism
of delegation does not work as it should. Its failure can be explained by
strong negative feelings against the entire regime of collective sanctions –
the sentiment that an approach that treats the group as one entity is deeply
immoral.
Another reason why collective sanctions fail may be found in a wrong
incentive structure. In dynamics across all 15 rounds the cooperation rate
under collective sanctions have been lower than under individual sanctions.
One of the plausible explanations is the main mechanism that presumably
had to drive peers to punish their team members who do not cooperate,
works in the opposite direction. Collective sanctioning sends a mixed signal
punishing cooperators despite their pro-social behavior. Instead of looking
for a cause of their trouble within the group, cooperators start changing their
behavior towards defection.
This feeling is mostly shared by those who position themselves as trustful.
Thus, lacking an institutional justification, collective sanctions might erode
social trust, and, as a result, decrease cooperation instead of increasing it.
To make collective sanctions work, a greater effort may be needed to make
people believe that their use is fair. In order to avoid framing effects in
the lab, we used highly neutral wording to describe the collective sanction
regime. We thus applied the, arguably unrealistic, assumption that partic-
ipants would need no information on the origin and “justifiedness” of the
specific regime. In real-life situations, the introduction of such a fundamen-
tally unfair regime begs for a certain level of justification and legitimization.
When used in practice, collective sanction regimes are usually explained by
the difficulty of detecting individual wrongdoers, and the wish to delegate
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such detection towards their peers. That is the way collective sanctions usu-
ally work in school collectives; for example, if no one admits to breaking a
window, the entire class is kept after school. Here, the central authority tries
to change the structure of the costs and benefits of whistle-blowing.
Another approach to justifying collective sanctions is with reference to the
guilt of third parties – a guilt that precedes the “wrong” action by an actual,
individual infringer, and which may be sees as having caused the later in-
fringement. The Russian tsarist government explained their use of collective
punishment to peasant communities for tax evasion of individual members
in this way. All peasants of the community are guilty, the logic goes, for “not
trying to convince their fellow to fulfill his duty, when they observed him
giving himself up to negligence and idleness” (Brockhaus and Efron 1896
Article “Frankpledge”). Different legitimation discourses may thus have an
effect on the efficiency of collective sanctions. Additional studies on the sub-
ject will be necessary to study these.
The generally higher level of cooperation shown by male subjects may be
explained by the higher cultural acceptance of collective sanction regimes in
predominantly male collectives, such as prisons and the army. This hypoth-
esis should be checked either in the field or in the lab. If we can induce the
permissibility of collective sanctions in the lab, would it change the attitude
towards it, and promote higher levels of cooperation?
As for the gender effects, we do not yet know if these occurs only in
gender-heterogeneous groups (the case of the present experiment), or whether
different effects would be observed in gender-homogeneous groups. An ex-
periment should be performed to determine how male subjects react towards
the application of collective sanctions on females – and whether they would
continue to support this sanction regime in the same way they do when it
is applied on themselves. It is probable that the idea of applying collective
sanctions on women is culturally unacceptable for male participants as well,
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and that it would provoke a counter-reaction, similar to what we have seen
with female participants.
Limitations of the present experimental design for external validity notwith-
standing, we believe that the results presented here make an important con-
tribution to the existing body of knowledge about collective sanctions. Their
introduction does not automatically increase public good contributions. Nei-
ther do collective sanctions make horizontal sanctions more efficient. Tak-
ing into account that collective sanctions can be more costly, produce a deep
sense of unfairness, and can lead to the rebellion (Heckathorn, 1990), they
should not be considered an effective measure against free-riding or other
kinds of antisocial behavior, at least not without any significant legitimation.
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Chapter 2
Can intergroup collective sanctions
increase cooperation between
groups?
Abstract
When members of one group encounter a norm violation committed by a
member of another group, this antisocial behavior is often handled by pick-
ing a random member of the community to which the perpetrator belongs
and by applying sanctions to him/her. Despite its prevalence, this kind of
third-party sanctioning is puzzling. Sanctioning for norm violations is a pub-
lic good, so there is always a temptation to free-ride, hoping that someone
else will enforce the norm. From a moral perspective, too, collective sanctions
are puzzling as they are not actually aimed at a guilty person. Nevertheless,
in real intergroup conflicts, collective sanctions are widely used. Functional-
ists suggest that groups resort to collective sanctions because this increases
the degree of cooperation between them. This effect is achieved by the dele-
gation of (peer) punishment from outgroup to ingroup members. This study
tests whether collective sanctions applied by outgroup members result in
higher intergroup cooperation, and whether the introduction of collective
sanctions increases the amount of ingroup punishment. The results demon-
strate that neither of these two functionalist arguments come true: partici-
pants avoid using collective sanctions against outgroups, and the amount of
ingroup (third-party) punishment is no higher under the intergroup collec-
tive sanctions regime.
Keywords: Collective sanctions, Public good game, Crime deterrence ,
Intergroup conflict
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2.1 Introduction
Everyday life provides a plethora of examples of when members of one group
are oppressed or harmed by another group indiscriminately as a response
to a crime or norm violation committed by an individual. Despite this, the
prevalence of intergroup conflict is significantly lower than is predicted by
most models. The functionalist argument states that the institution of collec-
tive sanctioning serves as a tool that promotes cooperation. There are two
mechanisms that make such sanctioning effective: first, a person may be
driven to avoid bringing harm upon their own group members because of
some sort of kinship altruism, or, second, random punishment increases the
chance for ingroup policing. The aim of this paper is to check experimentally
what happens to intergroup cooperation when a person can retaliate against
a random member of another group as a reaction to an individual’s norm
violation.
To begin, we will look into two situations in which indiscriminate inter-
group sanctioning took place; these will serve as a starting point for further
considerations of intergroup collective sanctions’ efficiency.
In August 26, 2016 in Loschinovka, a small town in southern Ukraine,
a 9-year-old girl was murdered. The local residents suspected Mikhail, a
21-year-old friend of the family and member of the Roma community to be
the perpetrator. Two days later, at a community gathering, the citizens of
Loschinovka made the decision to expel the entire Roma community from
their town. Despite attempts by the police to prevent this, the eviction was
executed the next day. According to the local press, a year later, in Septem-
ber 2017, the expelled families still remained homeless, mostly sheltered by
their relatives in nearby towns. This tragic story exemplifies the use of inter-
group collective punishment: as a reaction to a crime committed by a single
member, the entire group was punished.
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Often, intergroup collective punishment takes a slightly different, more
individualized form, however. A few days after the terrorist attacks of 9/11,
a Boeing aircraft mechanic from Arizona, Frank Silva Roque, drove with his
truck to the petrol station belonging to Balbir Singh Sodhi. Roque shot Sodhi
five times with his handgun, killing him. Roque was driven by the itch for
revenge on all Muslims for what had been done by Al-Qaeda in the Septem-
ber 11 attacks. As he admitted to his friends that day, he was “going to go
out and shoot some towel-heads.” The sad irony that his victim’s religious
affiliation was Sikh should not hide the curious fact that Roque decided to
kill a random Muslim in retaliation of the 9/11 attacks.
These two cases are structurally different. The first case was a collective
decision of one group (the villagers) to impose sanctions on all members of
another group to which the suspect belonged. Both groups were relatively
small, and the sanctioning group could blame the local Roma population for
inaction and indirect commission of this crime. Both groups had cohabited
together for a long time and could thus assess how close ingroup members
were. In contrast, the murder committed by Roque was driven by an individ-
ual desire, and was aimed at a random person who unluckily was perceived
to have the necessary feature of being a Muslim. What unites both cases is
a desire and demand for what psychologists call displaced revenge: third-
party punishment directed to an entire group or a random representative of
that group. In this paper, I will make one step towards a deeper understand-
ing as to how displaced revenge can affect intergroup relations.
We may brush off both cases simply as examples of “impulsiveness, irri-
tability, incapacity to reason” of the crowd (Le Bon, 1897). However, similar
sanctioning mechanisms are also suggested by serious academics. In a recent
study by Ginsburg and Simpser, 2017, the authors suggest using collective
sanctioning as a way of controlling recent migrants’ behavior in the US. They
suggest that migrants wishing to enter the US should form “trust circles”,
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which will be collectively held responsible should one member of such a cir-
cle commit a crime or other infringement. According to the authors, such a
policy would have two main consequences: a positive selection effect, and
increased ingroup policing. People who take the decision to migrate via the
“trust circle” policy will be cautious in selecting their partners in a way that
their partner’s delinquent behavior will not undermine their perspective to
stay. What is more, after migration, members of “trust circles” will be more
inclined to detect and inform on group members when they observe them
engaging in suspicious behavior.
The unfairness of such a way of rendering justice is obvious: the entire
foundation of modern justice is based on the concept of individual respon-
sibility. No one would like to be held responsible for something s/he did
not do. Nevertheless, as shown, intergroup collective or random sanctioning
is common, and, for some, has strong intellectual appeal. This paper looks
at the consequences of intergroup sanctions by asking: how do intergroup
collective sanctions influence intergroup relations?
2.2 Perspectives on intergroup cooperation
Both sociologists and social psychologists have quite low expectations re-
garding the prospect of intergroup cooperation. In general, they project the
Hobbesian war logic to the group level: groups should permanently be com-
peting over limited resources and should thus be in permanent conflict with
their neighbors. The classic 1960s Robbers’ cave experiment seems to sup-
port this intuition: the two groups were in strong competition throughout,
and were only able to fulfill a joint cooperative task when they had a goal that
united them both into a larger “supergroup” (Sherif, 1961). In fact, from the
sociological perspective, intergroup conflict may be constitutive for a group,
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as violence towards strangers can provide a sense of unity to a group (Gould,
1999).
Many political scientists hold the assumption that without a state that
controls and intervenes, heterogeneous groups are doomed to be driven into
conflict, and there is no chance for peaceful intergroup cooperation (see for
instance chapter 14 of Horowitz 1985). Evolutionary game theorists show
that altruism (putting a value on the utility of another person even if this
is costly to yourself), which we value so highly in interpersonal relations, is
closely tied to parochialism (hostility towards those who do not belong to
your group), and evolutionarily speaking, these two traits developed simul-
taneously (Choi and Bowles, 2007).
There is another, more optimistic line of thought, though. Its adherents
point out that the empirical facts contradict the predictions of permanent in-
tergroup group conflict, both for ‘primitive’ societies and for modern ones.
Many anthropologists and sociologists demonstrate that in many stateless
societies, intergroup cooperation, such as trade, flourishes. The obstacle of
mutual distrust is often solved through the development of complicated sys-
tems of gift exchange (Landa, 1994). In his historical overview of intergroup
cooperation in the Middle Ages, Leeson, 2008 also rejects the idea that with-
out the state, groups are doomed to intergroup conflict. For instance, the
analysis of court documents in Corsica, where presumably the tradition of
feud was widespread until the 19th century, showed that feuds were in fact
rare. In the modern world, if we compare the actual frequency of interethnic
conflicts in Africa with the number of potential interethnic conflicts, this ratio
does not even reach 0.1% (Fearon and Laitin, 1996).
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2.3 Why is intergroup cooperation problematic?
Before considering how collective or random sanctioning may convince mem-
bers of different groups to cooperate, let’s briefly review the main reasons
why cooperation fails. There are several reasons why intergroup cooperation
can be problematic. First, there is information asymmetry between groups.
The reputation of outsiders is usually unknown, and the costs of obtaining
this kind of information are higher compared to those for getting the same
information about members of one’s own circle. Second, ingroup bias under-
mines the expected reciprocity in cooperation. When an individual meets a
member of another group, they both know that the chances of cooperation
are lower than with their own group members, and that, in turn, the per-
son has a lower expectation of reciprocity. Finally, a person who, due to a
bad reputation, fails to cooperate with their own kin has to look for outside
contacts. The very intention of someone to deal with an outside group can
be a sign of their untrustworthiness, known inside the group. This negative
selection effect is closely related to information asymmetry.
How displaced revenge may solve the intergroup cooperation problem
If, despite all obstacles generated by mutual distrust, lack of informa-
tion about the agent’s reputation, ingroup bias, and negative selection, we
still observe intergroup cooperation more often than war, there should be
a mechanism that curbs intergroup conflict and allows people to cooperate
across group borders without fear of being betrayed by the partner. As func-
tionalists suggest, the mechanism in action here is the entitativity, or non-
distinction, between the individual members of the outside group. As we
could see in this paper’s introductory examples, people often treat members
of an outside group as a whole, without distinguishing between individuals.
A mob killing an innocent immigrant because another immigrant commit-
ted a crime one day before is among the most deplorable examples of such
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stereotyping, which nevertheless occur quite regularly.
There are two explanatory layers that account for the existence of random
sanctioning: individual-based and group-based, or, in other words, psycho-
logical and functionalist explanations.
2.3.1 Psychological explanation of collective sanctions
From a psychological perspective, random or collective intergroup sanction-
ing falls within vicarious or third-party retribution. It is a situation in which
“a member of a group commits an act of aggression toward the members of
an outgroup for an assault or provocation that had no personal consequences
for him or her, but which did harm a fellow ingroup member. Furthermore,
retribution is often directed at outgroup members who, themselves, were not
the direct causal agents in the original attack against the person’s ingroup.”
(Lickel et al., 2006).This definition is insightful for this paper because it intro-
duces both the third-party punishment, where the punisher is not the target
of a norm violation (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004), and collective sanctioning
where the punished individual is not the source of such a violation.
There are two lines of thinking that seek to explain this phenomenon at
the level of the individual. The first one links intergroup conflict with out-
group entitativity (Newheiser and Dovidio, 2015), i.e. the perception of a
group as a pure entity abstracted from the individuals it is composed of. The
larger the extent to which the group is perceived as unified, the higher is
the intention to punish the whole group or one of its random representatives
(Newheiser, Sawaoka, and Dovidio, 2012). When outgroup entitativity is
high enough, displaced punishment can be as satisfying from a justice point
of view as direct punishment (Sjöström and Gollwitzer, 2015).
That provides a rational explanation for such acts as the murder of the in-
nocent Sikh Balbir Singh Sodhi by Frank Roque. A punisher cannot (or does
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not want to) distinguish between specific group members, and treats indi-
vidual defections as a representation of the behavior of the entire group. A
rational agent increases the punishment contributions when the cost of pun-
ishment drops (Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008), so it is logical to choose
a target for sanctioning that is associated with the highest punishment effi-
ciency, for instance the first available member of the outgroup. Since it would
be much costlier for Frank Roque to find and punish a real culprit of the 9/11
attack rather than attacking Balbir Singh Sodhi, who was the first in his way,
he chose to punish the latter.
Instead of hypothesizing about the non-distinguishability of different out-
group members, another approach would be to build a causal chain project-
ing the individual guilt to those who are not personally involved, but just
share their group membership with the perpetrator. This is the so called a
“gatekeeper” logic (Kraakman, 1986), which is behind all types of third-party
or vicarious responsibility in modern law. Group members are punished not
for the action that was committed by their group member, but for their in-
aptitude to prevent this action. Formally, ‘gatekeeper liability’ is defined as
“liability imposed on private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by
withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers” (Ibid. p. 53). So, in sim-
ple terms, group members are not as innocent as they claim, because they
could prevent a crime toward another group if they wanted to. As psycho-
logical vignette experiments have shown, this legal line of thought is used by
the general audience as an argument for displaced revenge. People tend to
blame outgroup members either for indirect commission – the presumption
that other outgroup members encouraged the antisocial act, or omission –
the failure to prevent the act (Lickel, Schmader, and Hamilton, 2003).
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2.3.2 Functionalist explanations of intergroup cooperation
What if collective punishment can provide stability and peaceful co-existence
for two groups living side by side? Fearon and Laitin, in their 1996 paper on
interethnic cooperation, made exactly this argument. The logic is simple:
the fear that a person’s individual misbehavior towards an outgroup may
provoke full-scale intergroup conflict averts people from harmful actions.
One of the possible strategies that makes intergroup cooperation sustain-
able in the long run involves collective responsibility of the entire group
if one of its members misbehaves: “. . . to support cross-group cooperation
solely by threat of punishment by the offended group, punishment must be
indiscriminate, targeting either all members of the cheater’s group or some
random collection of them” (Fearon and Laitin, 1996, p.722). Collective sanc-
tioning moves the scope of the conflict from the individual level to the col-
lective by involving other parties not part of the initial contract. The threat of
such intergroup conflict – effectively a threat of cycles of retaliation between
the groups – will make participants more reluctant to defect with members
of the outgroup. In other words, collective sanctions make short-term profits
reaped by defection less attractive because the intergroup conflict the defec-
tion produces will be hazardous.
Moreover, collective sanctions put innocent ingroup members under the
threat of intergroup sanctions, which, in turn, will increase their motivation
to engage in ingroup peer punishment. This argument certainly applies to
kin. Many parents would prefer to suffer themselves rather than have their
children punished. The fact that altruism towards kin can increase levels of
cooperation is demonstrated by the institution of hostage-taking. Hostage-
taking was widely practiced in the Middle Ages to guarantee the fulfillment
of contracts, but is also used in North Korea, where diplomat’s families are
temporarily arrested while the diplomat is visiting other countries in order
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to guarantee that s/he will not run away. This kind of altruism, however, is
unlikely to apply to larger groups, and it’s effect thus limited.
Another rationale behind collective sanctions stems not from an ex ante
perspective (as the third-party liability argument), but flows from an ex post
perspective: if a perpetrator from another group is hard to detect and punish,
then the task of such punishment should be delegated to those whose oppor-
tunity costs of such punishment are lower, which are his own kin or team
members. Collective sanctions in this case, despite their unfairness, serve as
a delegation mechanism (Hechter, 1988). This delegation solves simultane-
ously two issues of intergroup cooperation: ingroup bias, and information
asymmetry.
2.4 Ingroup bias and third-party punishment
Psychological experiments on discrimination (Tajfel, 1970) showed that even
the weakest identification with a group results in discrimination towards out-
siders. There is a long debate about what is the source of this discrimination.
While the traditional view was identity-based, more recent behavioral ex-
periments demonstrated that the root of discrimination lies in general reci-
procity: group members favor their own co-members because they expect
that they will return the favor in the future (Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000).
This idea can be modelled in terms of indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sig-
mund, 2005). The indirect reciprocity model suggests that people cooperate
with each other because of reputation concerns. The reputational feedback
loop can be split into two parts: upstream and downstream reciprocity. In
upstream reciprocity, a person who recently received some benefits from a
third party feels that s/he would like to do the same to others. Later, in
downstream reciprocity, the benefit is paid back when a person who knows
that this individual has a reputation to treat others well will return him this
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favor. This logic of indirect reciprocity is based on the assumption that there
is a public space where information about an individual’s previous interac-
tions is freely shared. By definition, this sharing of reputation is hindered
across group boundaries. We treat outside group members as one unit; thus,
one member’s bad reputation casts a shadow on the reputation of everybody
else in the group. Information exchange is less intense across groups, so the
transaction costs to inquire about this specific person are higher when the
person is from an outgroup.
We may expect that ingroup bias would push people to punish their own
group members less than outsiders when they violate a norm. In reality, the
situation is more complicated. Some studies confirm the ingroup leniency
hypothesis (Lieberman and Linke, 2007): that people tend to be more tol-
erant to their own group members. However, if we treat punishment as a
second-order public good, we should expect the black sheep effect: people
tend to produce more of it when they deal with the ingroup members (Shi-
nada, Yamagishi, and Ohmura, 2004). Indeed, some studies find the “black
sheep” effect in third-party punishment; the willingness to punish offenders
is increased if people deal with their own group members (Gollwitzer and
Keller, 2010). Finally, some field studies demonstrate even more complex
patterns.Experimental research in Papua New Guinea showed that norm vi-
olators expected that a norm enforcer belonging to their group will be lenient
to them. At the same time, this research showed that punishers cared about
was not the group membership of perpetrator, but only that of the victim of
the crime (Bernhard, Fischbacher, and Fehr, 2006).
Whatever effect (black sheep or ingroup leniency) we observe in real-
ity, the introduction of intergroup collective sanctions presumably should
increase the frequency of ingroup punishment. For instance, in an inter-
group trust game, two different institutional mechanisms were tested: in-
group punishment and sharing the information about defectors to outsiders
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(Kimbrough and Rubin, 2015). The authors found a marginal effect of in-
formation sharing, but the introduction of ingroup punishment substantially
increased intergroup reciprocity.
Greif, 2004 provides a historical perspective of a sanctioning system with
a significant ingroup bias. In Medieval Europe, the judicial system always
took the side of the local citizen in his or her argument with an outsider. In
order to deal with such a bias, the community responsibility system (CRS)
was developed. This system makes all members of the outside community
responsible for their own members’ violations of a contract. The norm was
enforced through the seizure of property from any outside-community mem-
ber who happened to be in the jurisdiction of the community of the victim.
Thus, there were two ways to react for the outside community: either to stop
any kind of activity with the local community, or to detect and extradite the
norm violator. As described by Greif (2004, 2006), over time the second so-
lution gained in traction in the form of merchant guilds and community re-
sponsibility systems (CRS). In guilds, traders and craftsmen enforced norms
of conduct within their communities, and also punished misdeeds carried
out in other cities by their peers. In return, guilds or CRS in that city would
do the same with their own members. This system of mutually interdepen-
dent contract fulfillment functioned without any involvement of the central
state, which was very weak and prejudiced against outsiders.
2.5. Information asymmetry and third-party punishment 69
2.5 Information asymmetry and third-party pun-
ishment
A key issue in intergroup cooperation is information asymmetry. Within a
group, the cost of obtaining information about an individual is low. Punish-
ment strategies can be based on easily-observable individual behavior. How-
ever, when actors from another group decide to interact with members of the
first group, they often find themselves in a disadvantageous position: it is
hard to enforce a contract and even to identify the counterpart if the per-
son breaking it belongs to another group. Being unable to “get even” with
specific individuals, the actors have to deal with the entire group, which can
result in discrimination. This is one of the main reasons why integroup coop-
eration is so often based on stereotypes: “if individuals are hard to identify
or investigate across groups, then intergroup cooperation and trust cannot be
supported by punishment strategies that condition on individual behavior”
(Fearon and Laitin, 1996). If ingroup members know significantly more about
the perpetrator than outsiders, that knowledge solves the problem of asym-
metry. Outgroup members can now delegate the responsibility to find and
punish the norm violator. A final question is who among the outgroup mem-
bers should be made responsible to enforce the norm: “Groups can delegate
the monitoring task to individual agents, but this is likely to entail high costs.
If the burden of monitoring could be shared among the entire membership,
then agency costs could be avoided. The rub is that rational members will
only engage in monitoring on the group’s behalf if they have a sufficiently
large incentive to do so.” (Hechter, 1988). Here, intergroup collective sanc-
tions serve as a “large incentive” that can help to solve the internal collective
action problem.
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2.6 When intergroup collective sanctions fail
The main problem with collective or random sanctioning is the mixed signal
that it sends to the lawful members of the outside community. This prob-
lem is made clear by studies on antisocial punishment – punishment meted
out against cooperators rather than free-riders. Numerous studies across
the world have demonstrated that antisocial punishment is common (Her-
rmann, Thöni, and Gächter, 2008), and that when cooperators are punished,
this undermines cooperation (Rand and Nowak, 2011). Collective or ran-
dom sanctioning can be likened to antisocial punishment since by definition,
such sanctions target individuals that are not to blame. Thus, in a similar
fashion to antisocial punishment, we may expect that the more often coop-
erators are punished for the actions of their co-members, the less incentive
they have to cooperate in the future. This makes collective sanctions sen-
sitive both to group size and the frequency of interactions. As shown the-
oretically (Heckathorn, 1988), collective sanctions are efficient only in very
small groups. Historical evidence confirms the theory; merchant guilds and
community responsibility systems worked quite efficiently for propagating
trade and cooperation between medieval European communities. Ironically,
their efficiency was the reason for their collapse. As international trade and
the frequency of intergroup contacts grew, so did the incentive to fake com-
munity membership to gain from its reputation. Without modern means of
communication, the chances were high of punishing communities that had
nothing to do with perpetrators (Greif, 2002).
Collective sanctioning face issues on the punisher’s side as well: peo-
ple tend to avoid punishing a yet-to-be-identified wrongdoer (Small and
Loewenstein, 2005). That reluctance is caused by the same logic as the “iden-
tifiability of the victim” effect. We feel more sympathy to a specific person
than to an abstract one, and we dislike the specific wrongdoer more than an
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abstract one. Under random sanctioning, the target is unknown, so the will-
ingness to punish is lower. Collective or random sanctioning also violates
one of the main postulates of any punishment: it should be fair. The demand
for fairness has been found to be the leading factor defining the willingness
to punish (Singer and Steinbeis, 2009). This is another reason why collective
sanctioning is sensitive to group size: under collective sanctions, the chances
that punishment will hit the specific participant whose misdeed has been
observed declines with the size of the group. Ingroup members will there-
fore be less willing to collectively sanction an outgroup the larger in size that
group is. The declining willingness to punish can provoke a chain reaction,
resulting in lower cooperation and higher rates of defections:
1. The expectation of lower chances of being punished increases the propen-
sity to defect in the outgroup.
2. The lower level of expected cooperation among outgroup members de-
creases the chances of being held accountable by the outgroup, thus
undermining the willingness to punish ingroup members as well.
3. As a consequence, the lower chances of being punished for defection
by both in- and outgroup members decreases the level of cooperation
within and between groups.
From the above it should now be clear that, theoretically, intergroup col-
lective sanctions may be associated with both increased or decreased levels of
intra- and inter-group cooperation. The paper now moves on the empirical
section. As it unfortunately is impossible to test all theoretical conjectures
mentioned above in a single experiment, I restrict myself to testing a core
prediction that emerged from the discussion. Specifically, I test the hypoth-
esis that collective sanctions increase the frequency of in-group third-party
punishment.
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2.7 Experiment
To test empirically the effectiveness of collective sanctions in enforcing co-
operation, I designed a dedicated lab experiment in which I compare par-
ticipants’ behavior under two different sanctioning regimes. The first regime
combines intergroup collective sanctions with peer punishment and is hence-
forth referred to as intergroup collective sanctions (ICS). Under this regime,
participants can punish out-group members collectively, but also have the
option to exert influence over their peers by means of peer punishment. I
benchmark collective sanctions against another sanction regime: integroup
individual sanctions (IIS). The individual sanctions regime allows individual
sanctioning (i.e. peer-punishment) not only of in-group members, but also of
out-group members. This individual sanctions regime therefore gets rid of the
fundamental problem of intergroup norm enforcement, namely the informa-
tion asymmetry between ingroup and outgroup members.
I use these two treatment conditions to test how effective intergroup col-
lective sanctions are in terms of encouraging cooperation relative to the ‘gold-
standard’, intergroup individual sanctions. Specifically, I inquire how overall
rates of cooperation and punishment behavior differs between the two con-
ditions. Specifically, I hypothesize that 1) cooperation rates will be higher un-
der IIS, and that 2) the lower cooperation rates under ICS can be attributed
to a reluctance to (collectively) punish members of the other group under
ICS. Put another way, we should see relatively higher levels of (individual)
intergroup sanctioning in IIS, which can explain the higher cooperation rates
under IIS as compared to ICS.
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2.7.1 Experimental design
Two of the main theoretical works analyzing intergroup cooperation, Fearon
and Laitin, 1996 and Stoff, 2006, both use a social matching game (Kan-
dori, 1992) as their baseline model. In this game, members of two different
groups are matched with each other, and in each round, they play a Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game. As Fearon and Laitin showed, one of the subgame
perfect Nash equilibriums is to cooperate until one member of the outside
group defects. Then the entire group should stop cooperating completely
with outsiders. Stoff proved theoretically that this strategy produces a stable
equilibrium even faster when combined with ingroup punishment.
In this paper’s experimental design, I made a slight modification to Stoff’s
game. My goal here is to test cooperation rates in two different sanctioning
settings. In both cases, people first play Kandori’s social matching game with
a partner of the other group. Then they observe the decisions made by an-
other matched pair and make decisions on third party punishment. In two
different treatments two various institutions of sanctions were in action. In
the Individual intergroup sanctions (IIS) condition, participants can punish
the specific ingroup member involved in the interaction they observe, and the
specific outgroup member while under collective sanctions a random out-
group member is punished.
The experiment was conducted online with users of Amazon’s Mechani-
cal Turk platform. Data was collected in two separate sessions on September
13 and 14, 2017. The first session was run as the ’Individual intergroup sanc-
tions’ treatment, and the second session as the ’Intergroup collective sanc-
tions’ treatment. In each session, 60 participants took part.
As explained shortly, participants took part in the experiment in groups
of 6. Since workers on Mechanical Turk select their assignments individually,
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it was not possible to recruit the required groups of 6 in one go. This prob-
lem was solved in the following way: After signing a consent form, MTurk
workers were redirected to a waiting room, where they waited for 5 other
members to join. In order to avoid drop-outs, the participants were com-
pensated for waiting at a rate of 10 cents per minute of waiting. After those
10 minutes, participants would receive their participant fee, their compensa-
tion for waiting and were free to leave the study. In this way, the problem
of initial high-dropout rates was entirely solved. Unfortunately, one partici-
pant dropped out in the middle of game, which meant that an entire group
of 6 was not able to finish the task. The total number of participants whose
decisions are used in the analysis therefore is 114.
Once 6 participants had joined the waiting room, they were assigned to
a super group based on their arrival time. Each such group was subdivided
into two subgroups of equal size of 3, named Group A and Group B. Partic-
ipants were informed of their group membership and that they would keep
this membership across all 20 rounds.
Despite the fact that group membership remains fixed across rounds (a
partner matching), the identities of specific members were left unknown in
order to avoid strategic punishment, thus group members were not identifi-
able to each other between rounds.
The game consisted of two stages.1 In the first stage, participants engaged
in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with members of the other subgroup. Each
participant from Group A was randomly matched with a participant from
Group B. So in each round, three pairs of players were created.2
1Instructions for both stages were shown after assignment to the groups, and remained
available throughout the entire study. Screenshots of the instructions are included in Ap-
pendix F.)
2Since the subjects stayed part of the same super group of 6 for the entire set of 20 rounds,
the game can be considered a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, despite the fact there was only
a 1/3 chance in each subsequent round to be matched with exactly the same player (cp.
Hennig-Schmidt and Leopold-Wildburger, 2014).
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Each participant now had to decide how much out of his/her endowment
of 10 points to send to their partner from the other group. That is, participants
had the option to send anywhere between 0 and the full endowment to their
partner, knowing that their partner would take the same decision simulta-
neously. I thus followed the lines of Capraro, Jordan, and Rand, 2014, who
played a set of continuous prisoner’s dilemmas with various benefit-to-cost
ratios of cooperation. In comparison to the dichotomous outcomes in tradi-
tional binary Prisoner’s Dilemma games, this continuous scale allowed me
to get the more nuanced measures of cooperation. Whatever amount partic-
ipants sent to their partner was multiplied by a factor of 2.
Game-theoretical predictions
The predictions for the subgame that consists of a Stage 1 only are the same
as for the traditional finite Prisoner’s Dilemma with dichotomous choices: a
short-term profit maximizer would send nothing to their partner, while at
the same time hoping that their partner would cooperate fully. Since both
partners would apply this same logic, however, the theoretical prediction is
full defection. This is despite the fact that both partners could double their
payoffs if they reciprocated and sent each other their full endowment.
The theoretical predictions for the entire game (Stages 1 and 2) are delin-
eated in Fearon and Laitin (1996). The entire system has a chance to move
from full defection when the opportunities for either collective sanctions or
in-group punishment are introduced. There are three possible outcomes.
First, the full defection is still an option as in the subgame with no sanction-
ing institutions. Since punishment and external sanctions incur additional
costs for a punisher, that creates a motivation to avoid these costs. Another
equilibrium is a spiral one: out-group members punish randomly members
of another group, as soon as anyone encounters the defection in Stage 1 (Pris-
oner’s Dilemma), and this punishment triggers a counter-punishment wave
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from another group. However this stage in a spiraling equilibrium is never
reached because each party in Prisoner’s Dilemma avoids defection expect-
ing higher losses in case of an intergroup conflict. The last possible theoret-
ical outcome of a full game is what Fearon and Laitin call in-group policing:
no defection in mixed (outgroup-ingroup) interactions is punished, but the
defectors are punished internally by their own group members. In both lat-
ter cases the equilibria result in full cooperation in Stage 1. It is crucial to
emphasize here that both equilibria are purely ’theoretical’ in a sense that in
a real life a combination of these two polar solutions would be observed: a
threat of outward collective sanctions result in the in-group policing to some
extent.
In the second stage, participants were given the option to engage in third-
party punishment of both ingroup and outgroup members. This punishment
stage was implemented as follows. Immediately after having taken the de-
cision how much to send to their partner (Stage 1), but still before they had
learned the outcome of their own personal interaction, they were shown the
outcome of another interaction between an ingroup and an outgroup mem-
ber that took place in that round. Participants could then decide whether to
punish one, both or none of these other two participants. They thus engaged
in a third-party punishment decision in the sense of Fehr and Fischbacher
(2004) (although these authors studied punishment in the context of a Dicta-
tor game, not a Prisoner’s Dilemma). Only after participants had decided on
the whether and how much third-party punishment to assign were they in-
formed about the outcome of their own personal interaction in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
I decided to have participants engage in third-party punishment – rather
than simply have them punish the person with whom they had interacted in
Stage 1 – in order to be able to interpret their decision as norm enforcement.
There are three arguments to be made here. First, if a participant could only
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observe and punish his or her personal interaction, he or she may use the
punishment stage merely as an opportunity to change the outcome of the
previous interaction. Namely, s/he may try to equalize payoffs. As previous
studies on direct punishment in public good games have shown, inequality
aversion is one of the dominant motives in altruistic punishment (Masclet
and Villeval, 2008), so such behavior is quite likely. Second, in dyadic game
there is no space for second-order free-riding, making punishment less infor-
mative. If you are the only person who interacts with the defector, no one but
you can punish him. Third, in direct punishment, the motive of enforcing a
norm can be mixed up with the motive of personal retaliation. In contrast,
if a person observes the outcome of a third-party interaction, s/he sends a
signal about what kind of normative behavior s/he finds appropriate in a
group.
Punishment was conducted by means of deduction points that partici-
pants could assign to each other. The punishment factor was three, which is
the standard setting for public good games with a punishment stage (Niki-
forakis and Normann, 2008; Fehr and Gächter, 1999). This means that for
each deduction point sent, the recipient’s payoff was decreased by three. In
the beginning of each the punishment stage, participants received an extra
endowment of 10 points. This was done so that the players’ decisions on
punishment would not be affected by the amount of available points left from
Stage 1.
The two treatment conditions of the experiment – the ’Individual inter-
group sanctions (IIS)’ treatment, and the ’Intergroup collective sanctions (ICS)’
treatment – varied with regard to who could be targeted during third-party
punishment of outgroup members. In the IIS treatment, the punishment was
applied to the outgroup member whose decision was shown to a participant,
whereas in the ICS treatment, a random member of the outgroup was pun-
ished. Otherwise the two treatments were identical. Our main interest is
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how third-party punishment towards ingroup members varies between the
two treatment conditions. That is, our focus is on ingroup policing in the
sense of Fearon and Laitin, 1996 and Stoff, 2006. Beside this, another quan-
tity of interest are the overall cooperation rates achieved under the different
punishment regimes.
Before presenting the results, let me discuss once more the possible rea-
sons that could drive participants to send punishment points to their ingroup
members. After all, punishing ingroup members may look counterintuitive
because participants are never actually matched with them during the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma. By design, they cooperate or defect against the members
of the other group only. But as Fearon and Laitin predicted in their model,
concerns about group reputation should be a powerful driving factor behind
punishment intentions towards your own group. If a participant observes
their own group member defecting in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, s/he realizes
that this defection will lead members of the other group to form expectations
of low reciprocity for the entire group for the future PD interactions. Thus,
each defector decreases the future chances for cooperation for each member
of a group. What is more, defections by another ingroup member may trigger
retaliation by the other group, which may negatively affect the participant in
focus, even though s/he cooperated.
2.8 Results
Above, it was hypothesized that 1) cooperation rates would be higher under
IIS, and that 2) the lower cooperation rates under ICS can be attributed to
lower rates of intergroup punishment in ICS as compared to IIS. Table 2.1
sums up the overall results. I discuss the various findings in turn. I start
with overall cooperation rates, and then discuss punishment behavior.
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TABLE 2.1: Results overview intergroup punishment experi-
ment
Treatment N Average Contribution Average ingroup punishment received Average intergroup punishment
ICS 60 4.94 1.8 1.2
IIS 54 6.20 1.7 2.3
As hypothesized, the overall level of cooperation was lower under in-
tergroup collective sanctions, with an average contribution in all 20 rounds
of 4.94 points. This compares to average contributions under individual in-
tergroup sanctions 6.20. This difference is highly significant in a t-test (t-
value=6.38, p<0.001% ).
FIGURE 2.1: PD Decisions under IIC and ICS
What is driving this difference becomes clear when we look at the over-
lapping frequency histograms of PD decisions (Figure 2.1). Here we see that
the number of free-riders (those who contribute nothing) is almost the same
across treatments. The number of half-contributors (contributing about half
of their endowments) is also similar. But the number of those who fully con-
tribute 10 tokens out of 10 is twice as high under the individual sanctions
treatment.
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As shown in Figure 2.2, both punishment regimes were effective in sta-
bilizing cooperation over time. Contributions started somewhat above the
mean of endowment (at 6.9 tokens in the case of IIS, and 6.4 tokens in the case
of ICS). That is, remarkably, we do not see the deterioration of contributions
over time that is commonly observed in similar games without punishment
(cp. Ledyard 1995). In the last round, as it is often the case, we observe an
end-game effect with a decline in cooperation rates (cp. Normann and Wal-
lace, 2012).
We can also see that in all 20 rounds, IIS contributions exceed ICS contri-
butions. Second, there are no fully contributing groups in ICS, and there are
no groups in IS where contribution level entirely collapsed to zero.
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FIGURE 2.2: Average PD contributions per period
As speculated above, it thus seems to be case that intergroup collective
sanctions can help to create a stable cooperative equilibrium, even though
this is not as efficient as the one achieved under individual intergroup sanc-
tions. It should be repeated, though, that intergroup individual sanctions are
merely included here as a reference point. In real life, typically only collective
sanctions are available.
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With regard to punishment, Table 2.1 already showed that intergroup
punishment rates were much higher in the IIS treatment as compared to ICS:
1.2 against 2.3 tokens – in line with theoretical expectations. Arguably, partic-
ipants in the ICS treatment feared retaliation and therefore showed restraint.
Or they were concerned with the unfairness of collective sanctions.
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FIGURE 2.3: Ingroup leniency in individual intergroup sanc-
tions
There are hardly any differences with regard to ingroup punishment, which
was 1.7 tokens under IIS and 1.8 tokens under ICS. That is, there is no evi-
dence that collective sanctions induce a higher degree of ingroup punish-
ment. The fact that in IIS intergroup punishment is actually higher than in-
group punishment points towards ingroup bias: in making use of the avail-
ability of individualized sanctions, participants preferred to drive cooper-
ation up by punishing out-group members rather than in-group members.
This tendency is especially evident when we analyze separately only those
punishment decisions where both the in- and out-group member were pun-
ished. As shown in Figure 2.3, we can see that under ICS, sanctions are ap-
plied more or less proportionally. In contrast, under IIS, there is clear evi-
dence of in-group leniency, with in-group members receiving systematically
less punishment than out-group members.
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However, this conclusion about ’in-group leniency’ should be taken with
a significant grain of salt. The current experimental design does not allow
to distinguish between several factors that can produce more symmetrical
punishment reaction under collective sanctions. Under collective sanctions
participants have an extra motivation to punish their own group members
because they are unable to detect the specific targets in an out-group. The
efficiency of outward punishment drops, making an in-group punishment
more attractive option from purely rational point of view, whereas the hy-
pothesis of ’in-group leniency’ assumes that collective sanctions change an
intrinsic in-group bias which has rather psychological grounds.
These impressions are confirmed if we look at punishment over time (Fig-
ure 2.4). In IIS, intergroup punishment exceeds punishment of ingroup mem-
bers in all rounds up to the 17th. The decline in punishment rate in the last
rounds is also typical for games with punishment stage.
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FIGURE 2.4: Average in- and out-group punishment sent per
period in different treatments
Finally, we can find evidence for the relative higher efficiency of individ-
ual sanctions as compared to collective sanctions, which can further explain
the higher cooperation rates under IIS as compared to ICS. Under IIS, there
is a significant correlation between contributions and punishment . In con-
trast, under ICS, no clear such correlation is observable, which perhaps is
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unsurprising given that punishment, from the perspective of the punished
individuals, was applied somewhat randomly.
2.9 Discussion and conclusion
This paper began by exploring theoretically the efficacy of collective sanc-
tions. Theoretically, an institutional regime in which an individual misdeed
produces a risk of sanctioning for the entire group should result in a higher
degree of cooperation between group members. Also in theory, this higher
degree of cooperation should be achieved by means of increased ingroup
third-party peer punishment of norm violators.
The logic behind this conjecture is simple: collective sanctions provide an
additional motivation for ingroup members to find the person responsible
for the punitive measures imposed on some or all members. Thus, know-
ing that a norm violation towards strangers will not easily go unpunished,
when a potential perpetrator faces a social dilemma that involves a stranger,
she will weigh more carefully whether it makes sense to behave antisocially.
Members of the outside community become aware of the higher reliability of
ingroup members, and this makes them more eager to cooperate in return.
Therefore, theoretical works, like those by Stoff, 2006 and Fearon and Laitin,
1996, argue that collective sanctioning can explain why we observe lower
rates of intergroup conflict than might be expected from work on ingroup
bias.
My aim in this paper was to test empirically whether the introduction of
collective sanctions has a beneficial effect on intergroup cooperation. Based
on the result of the online study, the answer remains ambiguous. What I find
is that intergroup collective sanctions clearly do not create a degree of coop-
eration that can be achieved under the ‘gold standard’, individual sanctions.
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That said, the threat of intergroup collective punishment did help to sta-
bilize intergroup cooperation rates. It may thus be concluded that collective
sanctions can stabilize intergroup relations, but only at the price of relatively
high welfare losses.
Although the current experimental design can be considered a productive
starting point to inquire different sanctioning regimes in intergroup relations,
it has one serious constraint. One of the fundamental reasons why groups
may start using collective sanctions toward out-group members in the first
place is information asymmetry that has been discussed in the introductory
part of this chapter. But using the current design under individual sanctions
the amount of information each participant has in the stage of third-party
punishment when he or she observes the decisions of a randomly chosen
pair, is the same: decisions of both in-group and out-group members are
known, and in case of a punishment they will be sanctioned individually.
That makes an individual sanctions treatment an ’ideal-type’ benchmark used
to compare with collective sanctions treatment, rather then a baseline of infor-
mation asymmetry situation without collective sanctions. In order to check
more rigorously whether collective sanctions indeed can produce beneficial
effect on cooperation, in follow-up studies it will be necessary to compare
it with an alternative ’baseline’ with information asymmetry but without a
possibility to punish out-group members.
Some other caveats to this conclusion are in order. As many other be-
havioral experiments, this study has limited external validity.3 Inevitably,
intergroup relations are presented in oversimplified form. For example, in
this study, group members faced a binary choice to cooperate or to defect
3Lab experiments in particular are often considered to suffer from this shortcoming (Lu-
cas, 2003), and this criticism is often applied a fortiori to online lab-experiments like the
present one because of the relatively uncontrolled environment in which they take place.
However, systematic evaluations show that there appears to be no significant differences
between lab- and online experiments – see (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012) for further
discussion of the topic.
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against outgroup members. In a more realistic context, instead of either de-
fecting or cooperating with strangers, an individual can simply avoid outgroup
members. Moreover, both in a real life and in some theoretical models (such
as Fearon and Laitin 1996), only a minor share of a group needs to commu-
nicate and engage with strangers. The design that was used in this study
does not account for these subtleties, but it is an important first step towards
further understanding of mechanisms behind collective sanctions.
As a final note, I want to delineate aspects that could be added to future
extensions of the existing design, and which might serve to further increase
and deepen our knowledge of the subject. In this study, the only factors
that united the groups were their communication with each other, the aware-
ness of another group, and the ability to detect and punish defectors within
their group. This common fate and history can be important factors in cre-
ating ingroup cohesion (Campbell, 1958), but may be insufficient for pro-
viding enough motivation to punish other group members. If ways could
be found to further strengthen ingroup identities,4 this may result in clearer
results. Rather than strengthening group relations in the lab, another possi-
bility would be to bring this line of study into the field. This would allow us
to test how groups behave towards outsiders and among themselves when
group cohesion and entitativity are not artificially induced in the lab, but
provided by real life experience.
Finally, the present design also misses the important dimension of neg-
ative selection. Both in Stoff’s and Fearon and Laitin’s theoretical models,
group members had the option to cooperate with either their own group
members or with outsiders. This option attaches signaling value to the choice
of cooperation partner, which is missing in the present design. The fact that
4For example, techniques from studies using the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, 1982)
could be used.
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a person would like to cooperate with outsiders rather than ingroup mem-
bers can be a signal that she has a bad reputation within the group, and
thus has to look for contacts outside. This suspicion, in turn, can generate
distrust among outsiders, and can be an additional reason why cooperation
fails. This vicious circle can drive the situation to full conflict or to complete
non-communication between groups.
Vice versa, if outgroup members are known for their higher degree of
cooperation, at the extreme, ingroup members will prefer to cooperate with
them. In those rare occasions the members of less cooperative group will try
to tilt back the equilibrium to ingroup cooperation by punishing their own
group members for norm violations, in order to restore their group’s reputa-
tion. Allowing for the selective choice of cooperation partners may interact in
intriguing ways with both collective sanctioning and peer punishment and,
therefore, affect overall cooperation rates.
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Chapter 3
Crime, peer punishment and
collective sanctions: a lab
experiment
Abstract
This paper analyzes how the introduction of collective sanctions affects the
willingness to punish norm violations. The chapter presents a lab experiment
in which participants can choose to take money from a charity. After having
taken their own decision, they can observe the decisions of others, and can
decide to punish them. I test whether collective sanctions reduce the rate at
which people take from the charity, and at which they punish their peers un-
der a) an individual sanctions regime, or b) a collective sanctions regime. The
results demonstrated that collective sanctions significantly increased the fre-
quency of peer punishment. However, this increased rate of punishment did
not go along with lower crime rates. I conclude that, compared to individual
sanctions, collective sanctions are inefficient.
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3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to assess whether collective sanctions affect an in-
dividual’s propensity to make ethically questionable decisions. For brevity, I
will call decisions of this kind crimes. We may define a ‘crime’ as a risky ac-
tion that can produce individual benefits to the actor, while at the same time
bringing about harm towards a third party. In the experimental literature
that seeks to study crime in the lab, the amount of harm caused is usually
modeled to exceed the benefit for the perpetrator. This is done in order to
distinguish ‘crime’ from situations of pure wealth redistribution (Falk and
Fischbacher, 2002).
We speak of collective sanctions when an external authority (either an in-
dividual or an entire group) makes the decision to punish either an entire
group, or a random member of a group. Both types of punishment are com-
mon in experimental investigations (e.g. Dickson, 2007 and Fatas, Morales,
and Ubeda, 2010). To understand why random punishment can count as ‘col-
lective’, consider that the randomness of punishment produces the same re-
sults as the punishment of an entire collective, assuming that objects of pun-
ishment are risk-neutral: “Sanctions are collective when they are threatened
against or imposed groups of two or more individuals” (emphasis added).
That is, “collective” should be understood in ex ante sense, to take account of
the fact that sanctions directed against a single group member chosen at ran-
dom will have the same expected disutility for group members as sanctions
divided evenly among all group members (Levinson, 2003, p.277).
As discussed below, collective sanctions may affect crime rates in many
different ways. Here I will focus on one specific mechanism: the effect col-
lective sanctions may have on peer punishment. As discussed in Chapter 1,
collective sanctions hold the potential to solve the information asymmetry
between those interested in preventing crime (the outgroup) and potential
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criminals (the ingroup). Collective sanctions provide an incentive for a group
of potential criminals to monitor and punish each other. This threat of hor-
izontal punishment from their peers will, in theory, avert aspiring criminals
from actually committing a crime.
3.1.1 Background: use of collective sanctions in response to
crime
In the real world, collective punishment is used in response to crime or crime-
like offenses chiefly in three areas: offences committed in the context of in-
terethnic relations, breaches of corporate responsibility, and the management
of teams.
The situation in which members of one ethnic group punish random mem-
bers of another ethnic group for a crime committed by a single member is a
well-known mechanism to curb crime levels in the situations in which the
central authority is weak or non-existent (see also Chapter 2). In parts of
Tanzania, the vengeance for adultery spilled over the loving triangle of lover,
cheating wife and cuckold, making the entire village of the offender respon-
sible: “. . . if the injured husband did not find the adulterer he might kill any
village-mate of his enemy. Such an attack commonly led to war between the
two villages.” (Wilson 1987 cited by Nakao and Chai 2011). In this example,
collective punishment is not a reconciliatory or deferring measure, but a di-
rect way into full-scale conflict. That is why utilitarian individualists such as
Hardin warn us about the dangers of aligning group and individual interests
via the mechanism of collective responsibility (Hardin, 1995).
But despite – or in fact because – of this danger, collective sanctions may
also stabilize intergroup relations. The threat of violence spiralling out of
control may deter defections and thereby support intergroup cooperation
(Fearon and Laitin, 1996). One interesting feature of such retaliation against
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the entire group is that, in theory, it should produce less defection and more
cooperation even if the group size is small, such as in a three player Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (Stoff, 2006).
Corporate and vicarious (third-party) responsibility is the second large
area where collective responsibility for individual offenses is widely applied.
Companies often are often held responsible for the actions of their employ-
ees. Examples include the withdrawal of the license of a restaurant when
an employee fails to meet sanitary standards, the shutdown of a liquor store
where a clerk sells alcohol to a minor, or the closure of a brokerage by The
United States Securities and Exchange Commission when a single broker is
found guilty of inside trading, to name just a few.
A recent example is the fate of the auditors from the Arthur Anderson
auditing company: after being involved in the Enron affair, the company was
heavily fined. And even though just a handful of auditors were personally
involved into the fraud, “the sentencing of the corporate entity ruined the
livelihoods of all the other Arthur Andersen partners in the world whom
had no involvement whatsoever with the scandals” (Rönnegard, 2015, p.68).
A different example comes from Pettit, 2007. Pettit starts his paper on
corporate responsibility using an example of a ferry accident in the English
Channel: due to the negligence of the managing company about two hun-
dred people drowned. He argues that in a case like this “it can make good
sense to hold that while the individuals involved may not bear a high de-
gree of personal responsibility together as a corporate enterprise they should
carry full responsibility for what occurred” (Pettit, 2007, p.171). Transfer-
ring individual responsibility upon the entire company and making all its
stakeholders pay for its faults follows a consequentialist logic. Otherwise,
“[i]f employers can externalize liability costs through shallow-pocketed em-
ployees, their level of precaution-taking will be inefficiently low” (Levinson,
2003).
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The third area of wide-spread usage of collective sanctions is the man-
agement of teams. Team managers face informational disparity when they
have to monitor the behavior of their subordinates. When direct supervision
is impossible or too costly, managers rely on collective sanctions, “punishing
all work group members for one individual’s misconduct” in the hope that
this would make peer reporting more acceptable (Trevino and Victor, 1992).
A survey conducted in the year 2000 among corporate employees in the US
revealed that about one third had witnessed some kind of misbehavior in
their work during the previous year (Joseph, 2003). Collective sanctions can
help to stop team members from misconducting as their colleagues can often
actually observe the crimes committed by their colleagues. They have thus
a significant advantage over their team manager, who is often seated sepa-
rately. Often, the groups that have to share collective responsibility for a mis-
deed of one of their members are not institutionalized, but temporary. This is
the case for teams of scholars writing an academic paper, for instance: in the
case of plagiarism made by one scholar the reputation of everyone in a group
is ruined. Such collective responsibility sometimes is set in legal terms, too.
Stanford University’s policy on multiauthored research papers assigns “[a]ll
authors in a group effort... shared responsibility for the published results”
(Levinson, 2003, p.141).
3.2 Why collective sanctions may work
How effective are sanctions in general for deterring criminal behavior? Ra-
tionalists, usually associated with Hobbes and Locke, claim that people react
positively to rewards and negatively to sanctions, and change their behavior
accordingly. Thus, any punishment for antisocial behavior produces a proso-
cial effect. As Locke states “Good and evil, reward and punishment are the
only motives to a rational creature: these are the spur and reins whereby all
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mankind are set on work and guided” (Locke, 2007). A recent re-incarnation
of this principle was formulated by Hardin, 1968, who argues that the only
effective tool to curb self-interest for the sake of public good “mutual coer-
cion mutually agreed upon”.
Sanctions are usually thought of deterring both a wrongdoer and his or
her potential followers from committing a crime. This deterrence is twofold:
general and specific (Travis, Western, and Redburn, 2014). General deter-
rence preemptively repels an individual from crime commitment via the pun-
ishment threat. Specific deterrence makes a person who experienced a sanc-
tion more reluctant to repeat this action. The impact of collective sanctions
on these two dimensions of deterrence is mixed. On the one hand, under col-
lective sanctions there is a higher probability of suffering from the sanctions
even if a subject has no intentions to commit a crime, so the introduction of
collective sanctions makes general deterrence less convincing. On the other
hand, the number of those who personally experience such sanctions will be
larger, so specific deterrence under collective sanctions may seem to be more
efficient.
Collective sanctions usually make sense when there is a disparity of mon-
itoring costs between group insiders and outsiders. This disparity can be
either informational or executional. In case of informational disparity, the
detection of a non-cooperative type is more costly or difficult for an outsider
than for an insider. A police officer may not know the name of the local
pusher while those who live in the block know the identity of the dealer.
The executional disparity appears if the cost of punishment or prevention of
certain type of behavior is lower for those inside the group as compared to
outsiders. For example, such an extra cost of punishment can be a result of
limited jurisdiction: is a person who has an interest in sanctioning deviant
behavior eligible to do it? It is perceived legitimate for employers to sanc-
tion employees, but the same is inappropriate for clients. Similarly, parents
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can punish their children if these misbehave towards strangers. However,
if the strangers themselves take the matters to their own hands, it may be
a very costly enterprise for them. The reputational damage that the family
incurs for not punishing their own misbehaving member is one of the pos-
sible mechanisms to correct this disparity: without putting the question of
parental jurisdiction in the question, it gives outsiders the leverage to guar-
antee that punishment will be imposed via the “internal middlemen”, the
parents.
From these two types of disparity between the authority (the external
agent) and ingroup members follow three different logics that may drive the
authority’s intention to introduce collective sanctions as a reaction on a crime
(Nakao and Chai, 2011): informational, preferential and functional.1 Accord-
ing to the informational logic, the authority punishes a random suspect in a
culprit’s social group because of an informational disparity: the outsiders do
not know the identity of the wrongdoer. As Hardin states, “groups are apt to
have better information about their members’ actions than about the actions
of people in other groups.” (Hardin, 1995, p.118). According to the preferen-
tial logic, collective sanctions are used because the external authority expects
that punishing innocent in-group members would bring more harm for a
wrongdoer than a direct punishment suffered by him- or herself. And lastly,
the functional logic holds that group members will deal with the perpetrator
more effectively. In the functional logic, peer punishment is the main mecha-
nism through which collective sanctions translate into intra-group discipline.
3.3 Why collective sanctions may fail
From the descriptions above it may seem that there is a little doubt that –
through the incentivization of peer punishment – collective sanctions will
1These motives have been discussed in more general terms in Chapter 1.
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be an effective tool for crime deterrence. However, there are good reasons
why we should be doubtful that collective sanctions are a universal cure for
crimes and other misdeeds.
For a start, the rational approach to sanctions – that sanctions will always
work to move a subject in the desired direction – has been attacked on both
theoretical and empirical grounds. Criminal propensity theory suspects that
punishment is a bad tool to deter crime because criminals tend to be individ-
uals who are criminally-prone by nature. Being impulsive, high risk-taking
and present-oriented, criminals are also the least likely to be deterred (Wright
et al., 2004). Even worse, sanctions may not only fail to prevent crime, but
may crowd out prosocial behavior. Starting from the 1970s, psychologists
have explored how rewards and punishment may in fact undermine the in-
trinsic motivation for some socially beneficial actions (Kruglanski, Friedman,
and Zeevi, 1971). The presence of a sanctioning system undermines the belief
of participants that a collective good can be produced without them (Mulder
et al., 2005).
Collective sanctions may also fail because their internal logic harms basic
principles of just sanctions. These principles are the following: 1) Sanctions
should be fair: there should be a causal chain between punishment and the
wrongdoing; 2) Sanctions should be proportional: there should be correla-
tion between their size and the size of the harm the wrongdoing produced;
3) Sanctions should be bounded, or well-defined: for the specific crime, the
size and duration of sanctions should be known beforehand and finite. Col-
lective sanctions do not perform well on all three dimensions. By definition,
the causal chain is broken between action and counter-action: under collec-
tive sanctions formally non guilty actors bear the burden of punishment – just
because they belong to the same group as a wrongdoer. Depending on the
specific rules of punishment implementation, collective sanctions may also
fail on proportionality. For example, collective sanctions could be additive,
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meaning that if two perpetrators are caught, this cause twice the amount of
sanctions being imposed on the group as if one perpetrator was caught. With
such a rule, if the crime rate is high, the amount of punishment received
by each individual member will be disproportionally high. Finally, collec-
tive sanctions also lack clear boundaries: if the crime rate is not known, the
amount of sanctioning that an individual agent will receive is also unknown.
Another problem with collective sanctions is that they are perceived as
procedurally unfair, simply because the entire group is punished for a mis-
deed and there is no procedure that determines who specifically is guilty. To
be effective, punishment should be applied in a situation where the object of
punishment feels guilt, otherwise punishment fails to be an effective deter-
rent or even provokes counter-punishment (Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009).
Procedural fairness is crucial in raising individual satisfaction with the out-
comes. This principle has also been shown in the lab. Even if personally,
subjects suffer from a specific game outcome, they are less upset if they find
the process that resulted in this outcome procedurally fair (Lind and Tyler,
1988; Culnan and Armstrong, 1999).
A failure to meet the requirements of fairness and proportionality under-
mines the legitimacy of a regime, making it less effective. Any sanctioning
regime consists of an asymmetric dyadic relation where the active party, the
administrator of sanctions, produces some harmful actions upon the passive
recipients. If the sanction is perceived as unfair, however, the recipients of
the sanction may rebel and cease to cooperate to signal their disapproval. In-
deed, their willingness to send such a signal may be so strong that they may
be ready to incur high costs to do so.
The use of collective sanctions may also be hampered by a reluctance by
the active side in the sanctioning dyad, the administrator, to actually use
them. The administrator may refrain from imposing sanctions when their
fairness is doubtful for several reasons: moral costs, the expected threat of
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retribution, and empathy. First, there are usually moral costs associated with
controlling and sanctioning others. The questionable legitimacy of sanctions
increases these costs. Second, a person applying supposedly unfair sanctions
may expect retaliation from the recipient. Third, the administrator may put
himself in a recipient’s shoes: if he would end up in a similar situation, he
would prefer not to be the object of similar sanctions.
3.4 How do collective sanctions affect peer pun-
ishment?
Collective sanctions are defined as a negative measure that is applied to a
group ‘from above’ – either by a centralized authority, or by another group.
Conversely, peer punishment is a horizontal way of inflicting harm on one’s
peers. Peer-punishment is usually used if an actor believes that a group-
norm has been violated, or as a retaliation in response to a previous act of
punishment. By imposing collective sanctions upon the entire group, the au-
thority or external group may push the target group to establish norms in a
specific area and to provide enforcement of this norm. This outside induce-
ment is important, since group do not establish or enforce group norms about
every conceivable situation. Instead, “[n]orms are formed and enforced only
with respect to behaviors that have some significance for the group.” (Feld-
man, 1984, p.47). The threat that the misbehavior of a single member will
have everyone in a group be sanctioned provides such a ground for internal
norm enforcement.
There are competing explanations to explain peer-punishing behavior. In
Fehr and Gaechter’s experiment on altruistic punishment (2002), people were
expected to take part in the creation of a public good, and then, after observ-
ing the contributions of their group members, could, at a cost to themselves,
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send deduction tokens intended to decrease their peers’ final payoffs. The
authors link the propensity to engage in peer punishment to the idea of fair-
ness. Indeed, there is a lot of evidences that one of the main motives to pun-
ish less cooperative members of the community is inequality aversion and
retaliation for unfair actions (Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2005). In contrast,
Casari and Luini, 2012 theorizes that individuals have a hard-wired taste for
punishment, and engage in punishment even without taking into consider-
ation instrumental or fairness considerations. Applied to a situation where
peer-sanctions are combined with collective sanctions, both approaches pre-
dict higher peer-punishment under collective sanctions. Observing a peer
earning an additional income from a deviant behavior (here, free-riding in
the public good game) and suffering additionally from a collective sanction
being imposed in response to that behavior, peers have an extra motivation
to retaliate against their deviant peer. Collective sanctions and peer punish-
ment may therefore be considered two parts of the “ethical infrastructure”
of a group (Tenbrunsel, Smith-Crowe, and Umphress, 2003). Formal rules
imposed from above – the collective sanctions – are combined with a set of
informal rules enforced by the collective itself.
However, even though the two sets of rules may belong to the same eth-
ical infrastructure, this does not mean that there cannot be any conflicts be-
tween them. Quite on the contrary, the norms imposed through these two
channels can be totally different, because the objectives of external and inter-
nal sanctioning actors often oppose each other. Attitudes to whistleblowing
within a company may serve an example of such a conflict: while the man-
agement of an organization is interested in whistleblowing, the unofficial
sanctioning system usually severely punishes snitches. Tenbrusel et al. cite
the story of a petty employee theft at the Wisconsin mill in Wisconsin. After
blowing the whistle, the informant was found dead “at the bottom of a 20-
foot holding vat for tissue pulp. A jump rope attached to a 40-pound weight
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was tied to his neck” (Worthington, Chicago Tribune, October 12, 1993 cited
by Tenbrunsel, Smith-Crowe, and Umphress 2003). There is a direct conflict
between two spheres: “At the heart of this story are two contrary views on
the ethical principle related to employee theft: the formal perspective, which
classifies such behavior as unethical and illegal, and the informal principle
that employee theft is an action that should be tolerated and, perhaps more
important, not ‘snitched on’ by a fellow union member.” (Ibid). Collective
sanctions can be seen as a mechanism which aligns the interests of out- and
in-group members, thus solving this conflict. Stated in such terms, the main
research question of this study is to investigate how institutional changes in
the formal sphere – the introduction of collective sanctions – affect the infor-
mal sphere – the level and use of peer-punishment –, or, in short, the ethical
infrastructure of the group.
3.5 Hypotheses
We can thus formulate the following hypotheses, to be tested in the experi-
mental investigation below:
Hypothesis 1: Under a collective sanctions regime we will observe more peer
punishment.
The prospect of being punished for doing nothing will push honest actors
towards the peer punishment option. This is not the case under individual
sanctions, where a person is sanctioned by an external authority for his or her
own actions only. In the case of individual sanctions, the motivation for peer
punishment thus is purely altruistic. In contrast, since in the long run, peer
punishment under collective sanctions reduces the chance of being punished
by the external authority for each member of the group, members have a
self-interest in punishing.
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Peer punishment under collective sanctions regime serves as a substitute
to external sanctions. That is, at least the logic behind its implementation by
policy makers when outside detection of an actor responsible for a misdeed
is unattainable or overly costly. One of the most characteristic example of
collective sanctions that we can encounter in real life is a conflict between
a teacher and a school class. For instance a teacher trying to detect who is
responsible for a broken window, grounds the entire class. If group members
have a choice to preventively punish the offender at the prospect of potential
external sanctions, they are more eager to do it, especially if they are risk-
averse (it should be noted here, that the current design does not include risk
aversion measures, so this specific assumption will not be tested).
Hypothesis 2: Under a collective sanctions regime, the increased risk of being
punished by one’s own peers decreases one’s propensity to commit crimes/deviant
acts.
There are two mechanisms that can drive the incidence of crimes when
collective sanctions are introduced, which work in opposite directions. On
the one hand, the increased incentives for peer punishment increase the cost
of committing a crime, making it a less attractive option. On the other hand,
the fact that you can be punished by an external authority anyway, notwith-
standing your own decisions, may make crimes more attractive: if you are
likely to pay for what you have not done, it makes sense, at least, to receive
the extra payoff associated with the crime to compensate for the punish-
ment. It is hard to predict which mechanism prevails, but if the prevalence
of peer punishment substantially increases due to collective sanctions, it is
most likely that on balance, participants will be discouraged from choosing
the criminal option.
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3.6 Experiment
The present section puts the two hypotheses above to an empirical test. To
this end, I designed a dedicated behavioral game, which I then tested by
means of a lab experiment. I first introduce the formal logic of the game,
then introduce the experimental procedures, and outline the results.
3.6.1 Formal game description
Let’s consider the situation of two team members, both of whom have the
option to commit a crime (embezzle a company’s money, take a bribe etc.)
Each of them simultaneously decides whether to be honest and earn a regular
salary, w, or be dishonest, and seek a higher income Yc, which, however, in-
flicts a negative externality on the other team member. This option is referred
to as the criminal option or crime, and the team member who commits the
selfish act as the perpetrator.
If only one team member chooses to commit the crime, then the other one
has a choice to punish his or her partner. Punishment costs c for the punisher,
and F > c to the person who is punished. If the harmed person decides to
stay idle, then, with a probability of p, the criminal decision will be checked.
In this case, the perpetrator will pay a fine of F, and the other player will be
fined f , which is the fine for not punishing his or her criminal peer.
In the experiment, as in the other chapters, there will be two treatment
conditions: an individual sanctions regime, and a collective sanctions regime.
For the individual sanctions regime, f = 0, and for the collective sanctions
regime, we will set f = F.
Game-theoretical predictions are rather straightforward. If the cost of
punishing a partner exceeds the expected cost of collective punishment (c >
p f ), then a participant will always stay idle. Then, knowing that there is
no chance of being punished by his peer, the second player will commit the
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crime if he knows that the net profit of the crime is positive (Yc > pF). So
if both participants have similar estimations of their potential profits and the
probability of being caught, and there is complete information (that is, both
participants know about each others’ preferences and estimated probabili-
ties), there will be two pure equilibria: both will either commit the crime or
none will. If information is incomplete, peer punishment becomes possible.
Depending on whether players under- or over-estimate their partner’s costs,
peer punishment may or may not occur.
3.6.2 Experimental design
The following section introduces the experimental procedures. I designed
a two-player experimental game in which I operationalize crime in terms
of withheld donations to a charity. The game was played in two treatment
conditions, an indvidual sanctions treatment, and a collective sanctions treat-
ment.
The experiment was conducted with 160 participants at the Indian Insti-
tute of Management in Ahmedabad (IIMA), India, during five sessions that
took place between January 29th and February 13th 2015. The experimental
script and more detailed information on the session procedures are provided
in the appendix to this chapter.
The experimental setup largely followed the theoretical outline above,
and all design choices are summed up in Table 3.1 below. Upon arrival, peo-
ple were matched with a partner to form a team of two. They then took their
decisions individually.
The decision task consisted of a simple choice, which was repeated over
several rounds: to take a blue envelope, or, instead, take a green envelope.
Taking an envelope simulated either taking a socially approved and socially
beneficial, ‘regular’ course of action (represented by the blue envelope), or
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instead choosing a ‘deviant’, or ‘criminal’ course of action (represented by a
green envelope).2
There were ten green and ten blue envelopes to choose from. Each blue
envelope guaranteed an income of 10 rupees for a participant. In addition,
upon the choice of the blue envelope, 25 rupees would be donated to a char-
ity. The choice of a green envelope, in contrast, typically guaranteed a payoff
of 25 rupees for the participant, but reduced the donation to the charity to 0.
If we assume that the trust to the effectiveness of NGOs is high enough
the socially optimal behavior is to choose blue envelopes. In order to reduce
the potential bias resulted by a choice of a specific charity, we announced
the name of charity after the study has been completed. Choosing green
envelopes was individually profitable, but collectively harmful, resulting in
an external negative externality of 15 rupees. Choosing the green envelope
therefore corresponds to selfish and deviant behavior – henceforward re-
ferred to as the ‘crime’ in this text.3
Yet there was another twist: out of the 10 green envelopes, 3 actually were
empty. Choosing a green envelope, the participants thus had a 3/10 chance
of ending up with no payoff. This danger of drawing a blank envelope was
the implicit punishment for committing the ‘crime’. Note that despite this
potential for punishment, the individual expected income from taking the
criminal option nevertheless remains higher than the expected income from
the ‘regular’ option (taking the blue envelope) – 17.5 rupees for the crime vs.
10 rupees for the ‘regular’ behavior. In order to test whether people behave
2In the instructions or during the games, at no point loaded terms such as ‘punishment’,
‘crime’ or ‘delinquency’ were used (see the Appendix for the text of the instructions). I here
use these terms for the sake of referential homogeneity with the theoretical model.
3It should be mentioned that in most peer-punishment studies, participants are typically
first faced with a social dilemma, not a donation task. In a social dilemma, an individual
profits from selfishness unless everyone chooses the selfish alternative, in which case the
whole group loses (Schroeder, 1995). These social dilemmas are usually modelled as public
goods games. In the current design I avoid the social dilemma situation as a baseline for peer
punishment and collective sanctions. I do so in order to disentangle the personal motive of
being angry with a free-rider from the motive of retaliation against the moral unfairness of
the perpetrator’s actions.
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differently in response to changing risks of discovery (cp. Loewenstein et al.,
2001), in a variation of the experimental setup, the chance of detection for
perpetrators was set to p = 0.1 rather than p = 0.3. That is, in this variant,
only 1/10 of the green envelopes was a blank.
TABLE 3.1: Design
Variables Individual Sanctions Collective Sanctions
Yh Payoff for honest behavior (blue envelope) 10
Yd Payoff for deviant behavior (green envelope) 25
NE Negative Externality 15
p Probability to get 0 (blank envelope) 10%; 30%
in case of criminal behavior
w Cost of peer punishment 5
c Fine for Collective Sanctions 10 0
The two treatments conditions differed with regard to the consequence of
drawing a blank envelope. In the individual sanctions treatment, if a person
chose an empty green envelope, this did not affect the payoff of the other
team member. In contrast, in the collective sanctions treatment, if an enve-
lope was empty, the other team member’s payoff was diminished by 10 ru-
pees, meaning that both the perpetrator and his or her team member would
finish the round with 0 rupees. Therefore, in the individual sanctions treat-
ment, only perpetrators got punished (with a certain probability). In contrast,
in the collective sanctions treatment, perpetrators got punished for commit-
ting the crime and the other member of the team was penalized for staying
idle.
In addition to this ‘institutional’ punishment by an external authority (the
game designer), participants could engage in costly peer punishment. This
was implemented as follows. If a team member chose the green envelope,
the other member was given the option to pay 5 rupees to punish his or her
peer. Punishment immediately set the payoff of the criminal team member
to 0 – rather than the likely 25 rupees from the green envelope. That is, in a
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round were one team member chose the green envelope, and the other chose
the blue envelope and decided to punish his or her peer, the former would
end the round with 0 rupees, and the latter with 5 rupees. In situations where
both team members chose the green envelope, both could punish each other.
If, instead, both team members chose the ‘honest’ course of behavior and
chose the blue envelope, peer punishment was unavailable.
This latter choice was made to resemble real-life situations. In real life,
when there is no crime, there is no punishment. So if nobody chooses the
green envelope, the game would end here. In order not to lose data in these
situations where none of the team members committed the crime, partici-
pants took their punishment decisions using the strategy method. That is,
they indicated how they would behave, both if the other team member had
committed the crime, or if s/he had not.4 The real action of their team mem-
ber was revealed at the end of each round. The game thus proceeded in three
stages:
• Stage I: Participants take their decisions what kind of envelope to choose.
• Stage II: The participants take their decision on costly peer punishment
using the strategy method.
• Stage III: Participants draw one envelope out of 10 (either green or
blue) and get rewarded according to the rules of the game.
In cases with full peer punishment in the second stage, i.e. if all members
who chose the green envelope were punished by their peer, the game ended
after the second round as there was no more money to be taken away.
4The strategy method has been shown to be as reliable as the direct-response approach
(Brandts and Charness, 2011).
3.7. Results 105
I tested the effect of individual vs. collective sanctions on the participants’
behavior using both within- and between subject designs.5 80 of the 160 par-
ticipants played the game in the between-subject design: 44 under the indi-
vidual sanctions regime, and 36 under the collective sanctions regime. The
other 80 participants played in the within-subject design. That is, they played
under both individual sanctions and collective sanctions. To avoid order-
effects, half of the participants first faced the individual sanctions regime and
then the collective sanctions regime, while the other half faced the reverse or-
der. The reduced probability of detection – p = 0.1 instead of p = 0.3 was
implemented for 58 participants in the within-subject design. These treat-
ment conditions are summed up in Table 3.2.
TABLE 3.2: Overview of treatment conditions
Individual Sanctions Collective Sanctions
Between-subject design p = 0.3 44 36
Within-Subject Design p = 0.1 58
(IP-CP; CP-IP*) p = 0.3 22
*Half of each within-subject subgroups played “Individual Sanctions" first,
and half played “Collective Sanctions" first.
3.7 Results
The two hypotheses to be tested were that 1) under collective sanctions there
would be more peer punishment, and 2) that under collective sanctions there
would be less crime. I present the results for the within- and the between-
subject treatment separately, starting with the results of the within-person
design, summed up in Table 3.3.
5Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages (cp. Bellemare, Bissonnette,
and Kröger, 2014), but without prior experience, it is not possible to predict which specific
design will bring about more robust results.
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As for peer sanctioning, punishment rates appear to be similar across con-
ditions. Under the baseline rate of detection of p = 0.3, the number of those
who punished their peers was 24.4% in IS, and 27% in CS. With the lower de-
tection probability of p = 0.1, these values changed to 25.1% in IS and 32.7%
in CS. While these results seem to support hypothesis 1 that there would be
more peer-punishment under collective sanctions, differences are not statis-
tically significant.
With regard to the crime rate, i.e. the share of participants choosing the
green envelope, the following pattern is observable: under IS, 36.3% chose a
green envelope, while under CS, the rates of perpetrators was slightly lower
(30% chose the green envelope). While on the face of it, this result seems
to support hypothesis 2 that crime rates should be lower under CS, this dif-
ference in behavior is not statistically significant. When the probability of
sanctions was decreased to p = 0.1, the number of those who chose the green
envelope grew strongly to 61% in IS, and 57% in CS – a result which conforms
with the increased expected utility of taking the green envelope. However,
again the difference between conditions is not statistically significant.
TABLE 3.3: Results overview within-person design
Treatment Individual Sanctions (IS) Collective Sanctions (CS)
Probability of detection 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1
Crime rate
(% choosing green envelope)
36.6% 61% 30% 57%
Punishment
(% punishing their peers)
24.4% 25.1% 27% 32.7%
Looking at the dynamics of crime and peer punishment across periods,
the overall impression of similar behavior under IS vs. CS seems to be con-
firmed. In the first three rounds there are strong differences between treat-
ments both in ’crime rate’ and peer punishment frequency. Later on, this
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difference fades away. The main explanation for this phenomenon is the
’learning effect’: it is rather typical to have a certain amount of noise at the
beginning of the multi-round game, which disappears as participants start
understanding the mechanics of the game and an incentives structure better.
While IS seems to produce slightly higher crime rates and lower peer pun-
ishment, confidence intervals overlap at most times, meaning that differences
between the two conditions fail to reach statistical significance.
FIGURE 3.1: Crime rate and peer punishment over time in the
within-person design
More intriguing results are obtained in the between-subject setting, sum-
marized in Table 3.4. With regard to the overall crime rate, the pattern we
just observed seems to be reversed, an impression that is confirmed in Figure
3.2.
TABLE 3.4: Results overview between-person design
Treatment Individual Sanctions (IS) Collective Sanctions (CS)
Crime rate (% choosing green envelope) 58% 62%
Punishment (% punishing their peers) 21% 31%
Now, the crime rate is higher in CS (at 62%) than in IS (at 58%), contrary
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to the hypothesis. However, once again, differences are not statistically sig-
nificant. It therefore appears that, in fact, IS and CS produce very similar
crime rates. Put another way, individual sanctions and collective sanctions
seem similarly effective in containing or not containing crime.
When we look at peer-sanctioning behavior, however, we observe that
here the differences between CS and IS are substantial and statistically sig-
nificant. The peer punishment rate is 21% under IS, but a whooping 31%
under CS. As shown in Figure 3.3, the peer punishment is higher in CS than
IS in the majority of rounds, and confidence intervals hardly overlap.
FIGURE 3.2: Crime rate (share of participants choosing the
green envelope) over time under IS and CS
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FIGURE 3.3: Punishment rate (share of participants choosing to
take the criminal income of their peer away) over time under IS
and Cs
The reasons for this difference is illuminated if we look at the kind of de-
cisions the punishers took at the first stage (Figure 3.4). Looking first at partici-
pants who took the ‘honest’ or ‘regular’ decision by taking the blue envelope,
we can see that there are hardly any differences between the two conditions.
Under CS, the rate of those who chose a blue envelope and punished (34.1%)
is almost exactly the same as under IS (34.6%).
If participants took chose a green envelope themselves, however, then,
under IS, only 12% of them chose to punish those who also chose the green
envelope. That is, under IS, criminals do not punish other criminals.6 In con-
trast, under CS, the number of those who also took green envelopes them-
selves is 29% – a 2.4 times higher rate! So under CS, both ‘regular citizens’
and criminals punish – or retaliate against – other criminals.
6The 12% who do so anyway may be motivated by ‘spiteful’ motives in the sense of
Jensen (2010).
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FIGURE 3.4: Punishment behavior by perpetrators of crimes vs.
non-perpetrators under IS and CS
I now use a multivariate model to assess whether peer sanctions are ac-
tually effective to curtail crime under the different punishment regimes. In
the model, I consider how the likelihood of choosing the green envelope, i.e.
committing the crime, is affected by a) the choice of envelope in the previ-
ous round, and b) peer punishment in the previous round. I also control for
gender and self-reported trust to improve precision. The dependent variable
takes the value 1 when a green envelope is chosen, and 0 if a blue envelope
is chosen. For the analysis, I use a probit model with random effects for the
rounds of the experiment, clustering standard errors at the level of the indi-
vidual.
Table 3.5 reports the results. We can see that, as already shown above, the
baseline propensity of committing a crime is subtler higher (4% difference)
under collective sanctions, but that this difference is not statistically signifi-
cant. The choice of envelope in the previous round has little predictive power
for the choice of a green envelope in the subsequent round, and neither have
gender or self-reported trust.
Although not statistically significant, it is nevertheless interesting that
the choice of a green envelope in the previous round (slightly) decreases the
chance that a participant will choose the same envelope at the next stage.
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There are two different explanations: either people believe they will not be
lucky twice, and thus prefer to choose the blue envelope after choosing the
green one, fearing that they might otherwise pick an empty envelope. Or
they prefer to vary blue and green envelopes as a gesture of sharing with the
charity at least sometimes.
The most interesting results pertain to the effect of peer punishment. Here
we can see that under IS (represented by the constitutive term ‘Peer-punishment
at t− 1’), peer punishment has a slightly discouraging effect on committing
the crime in the subsequent round. Under CS (represented by the interaction
term), however, this effect is much stronger and highly statistically signifi-
cant. This means that under CS, peer punishment is actually more effective
than under IS in reducing crime.
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TABLE 3.5: Probit random effects model of criminal behavior
on previous punishment and other covariates
Choice of green envelope at t = 0
Col.sanctions 0.538
(1.57)
Peer-punishment at t− 1 -0.0928
(-0.71)
Col.sanctions X Peer-punishment at t− 1 -0.571**
(-2.96)
Choice green envelope at t− 1 -0.0621
(-0.62)
Gender 0.516
(1.37)
Trust 0.344
(1.00)
N 1,520
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
It therefore may seem paradoxical that crime rates appear to be the same
under IS and CS. We can speculate that this seeming paradox is due to an
effect mentioned earlier: the very fact that under collective sanctions they
might be punished without being guilty might actually push people to be-
have more deviantly under this sanction regime – resulting in a higher base-
line rate of crime under CS as compared to IS.
This means that the similar crimes rates in IS and CS come that the price
of efficiency. Indeed, due to the higher occurrence of punishment under CS,
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participants ‘burned’ a lot of money, and ended up with lower average earn-
ings per round than under IS: 9.5 rupees vs. 11.8 rupees. The fact that peer-
punishment is used more excessively under CS also showed in answers to a
survey, delivered after the experiments. Here I asked participants whether
they would be involved in peer punishment more if the price of such a pun-
ishment would decrease from 5 to 3 rupees. Under IS, the majority of the par-
ticipants (61%) claimed that they would not punish more often in response to
the decreased price. The opposite was observed under CS, where 56% would
punish more often.
A hint that collective sanctions somewhat erode morality is suggested by
the post-hoc justifications of taking a blue envelope, i.e. the ‘honest’ course of
action. In the post-game survey, I suggested three main reasons why people
might decide to take the blue envelope, and let them choose an answer. These
reasons were, a) the unwillingness to bring harm to a third party (“Taking
the green envelope means taking money away from the charity"), b) avoid-
ance of being punished by the external authority (“The green envelope can
be empty"), and c) avoidance of being punished by one’s peer (“The other
participant can make the green envelope empty"). The participants rated the
importance of these factors in their decision of taking the blue envelope on a
5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (less important) to 5 (more important).
Table 3.6 shows the average importance of these motives across treat-
ments. As can be seen, under individual sanctions, the harm to a third
party – or the relative morality of the action – was somewhat more impor-
tant to participants, whereas for the other, more self-interested motives, the
importance-rating was similar across sanctions. This is in line with the idea
that collective sanctions erode the individual responsibility.
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TABLE 3.6: Motives for choosing the blue envelope
Individual Sanctions Collective Sanctions
Taking the green envelope takes 3.8 3.3
money away from the charity
The green envelope can be empty 2.8 2.9
The other participant can make 2.8 2.9
the green envelope empty
Similarly, I had people rate potential motives why they would refrain from
punishing their peers. The participants evaluated the relative importance of
the following factors: a) individual cost (“Emptying the envelope was too
costly"), b) moral considerations (“It is bad to punish other people without
sufficient reason"), and c) fear of retaliation (“If I do it, the other participant
may empty my envelope as well"). These ratings are shown in Table 3.7.
TABLE 3.7: Motives for refraining from punishment
Individual Sanctions Collective Sanctions
Emptying the envelope was too costly 3.0 3.1
It is bad to punish other people 3.8 2.9
without sufficient reason
If I do it, the other participant 2.3 2.9
may empty my envelope as well
Again we can see that moral considerations play a more important role
under individual sanctions than under collective sanctions.
A final piece of evidence comes from the trust question. I asked respon-
dents the standard trust question (“Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with
people?”).
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TABLE 3.8: Choice of blue envelope depending on self-reported
trust
Individual Sanctions Collective Sanctions
Most people can be trusted. 50.3% 37.2%
Need to be very careful with people. 37.2% 37%
Table 3.8 reports the share of participants that chose the blue envelope/behaved
‘honestly’ depending on their self-reported trust and the treatment condi-
tion. We see that under individual sanctions, there is the positive correlation
between trust and ‘honest’ behavior that we would expect to see: trusting
people – who believe in the morality of others – behave more morally them-
selves. Under collective sanctions, this correlation vanishes. Trusting people
behave just as morally as amorally as non-trusting individuals.
3.8 Conclusions
We are now in a position to make a more informed judgment about the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of collective sanctions. It seems clear that if a policy
maker would like to curb the crime rate, or somehow differently affect proso-
cial behavior, it does not seem to be advisable to count on collective sanctions.
This is for two reasons.
First, collective sanctions are not particularly effective. The data showed
that collective sanctions did increase peer punishment and strengthened the
link between peer punishment and reduced crime. However, neither in the
within-subject design, nor in the between-subject design, did collective sanc-
tions perform better than individual sanctions in actually reducing the crime
rate (i.e. increasing donations to charity).
Second, collective sanctions are inefficient. By increasing the rate of pun-
ishment, they also caused a lot of money being spent in an unproductive
way. As shown, earnings were significantly lower under collective sanctions.
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They thus constitute an expensive way to reach a crime rate that can more ef-
ficiently be reached through individual sanctions.
Two questions remain open, however. First, why, if collective sanctions
are so inefficient, are they still widely used, as shown in the introduction
to this paper? Second, what are the exact reasons why collective sanctions
underperform despite the fact that they encourage peer punishment? I pro-
vided some evidence that the feeling of unfairness generated by collective
sanctions undermines moral motivations that also help to drive down crime
rates. However, more detailed studies would be necessary to fully answer
this question.
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Conclusion
The advantage of a correctly conducted experimental approach is that it fo-
cuses only on one single property of a phenomenon in question, isolating it
from all contextual factors (Guala, 2009). By testing a bare, highly abstract
construction against a baseline scenario, we minimize the risk of interactions
with other factors. Otherwise, these interferences make it hard to draw causal
conclusions (Neuman, 2013, p.282). This strong point of the experimental ap-
proach, however, results in a certain degree of artificiality, inevitably leaving
many important questions on the sidelines (Webster and Sell, 2014).
In this conclusion, I would like to briefly describe the topics that, due to
this study’s chosen methods, were not covered enough in this thesis. These
topics are a logical continuation of some key questions raised during the
course of this thesis’ studies.
The discussion of consequences of collective sanctions necessarily revolves
around groups. Notably, we discussed how collective sanctions affect inter-
group cooperation, ingroup cooperation and peer punishment. Except for
brief references to feelings of unfairness, questions of individual perception
and decision-making were largely neglected. This is true in particular for
the important question of an individual’s decision to enter or leave a group.
That makes us ask the following questions: how do collective sanctions affect
group composition? Do some conditions make collective sanctions a more
legitimate solution in the eyes of their target? Does the group increase its
coherence under the threat of collective sanctions or do, in contrast, single
members actually feel more atomized? How does the share of sanctions a
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given group member receive affect his or her behavior in the group?
These questions of selection, legitimacy, interdependence and distribu-
tion are deeply interconnected. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, I discuss
them one by one.
Selection
Both theoretical and empirical works have shown that selection (both with
regard to entry into, and exit from a group) is an important factor in group co-
operation; groups with more selective entrance requirements typically demon-
strate higher degrees of cooperation (Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon, 2009). In all
three of this thesis’ studies we treated the groups’ composition as given. In-
dividuals received their group membership as an ascribed property in the be-
ginning of the experiment. Although this is the typical design for most of the
experimental studies of social dilemmas (Chaudhuri 2011 provides a short
list of experiments on endogenous group composition), this static picture is
by far not complete, since selection processes can exert a strong influence on
the pattern of cooperation established within a group.
An example is provided by Guthrie (2000), who studied employee turnover.
He compared companies in which team compensation was equality-based
with companies in which team compensation was equity-based. The former
can be interpreted as collective reward (with similar properties as collective
sanctions), while the latter is closer to traditional rewards based on individ-
ual effort. The equality-based groups had a lower turnover than those in
which team rewards were distributed based on each member’s individual
input – the composition in terms of personnel in equity-based teams were
much more stable. If this logic can be projected onto different sanctions
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regimes, this would suggest that groups operating under individual sanc-
tions should be less sustainable, and those operating under collective sanc-
tions more sustainable. Through this mechanism, collective sanctions may
affect not only the longevity of the group, but also its quality. If those who
decide to stay or join such a group would tend to have similar properties,
they will create a specific culture that in turn will shape who selects into the
group.
Legitimacy
Considering such selection dynamics turns our attention to the related ques-
tion of legitimacy. Narveson (2002), in his treatise on the legitimacy of collec-
tive sanctions, classifies groups according to their susceptibility for collective
liability. His main classification criterion is the degree of freedom of mem-
bership. He argued that in groups where members are free to join and quit
at any moment, it makes sense to blame each member for an act committed
on behalf of the group by one or some its members. This is because the very
act of membership in this case is a demonstration of adherence to group val-
ues. Collective sanctions may therefore meet a degree of acceptance and be
considered legitimate. In contrast, in groups where membership is manda-
tory, there is no implicit acceptance of group values, and collective sanctions
therefore are seen as illegitimate.7
A more general point about considerations of legitimacy in the context of
sanctioning is in order. Sociology is a positivist science; it is not concerned
with how things should be done, but rather with how they actually happen,
7An important but overlooked question is heterogeneity in terms of the ability to leave
a group, and the consequences of this heterogeneity on group composition. What if the
ability to exit the group is unevenly distributed among members? Then it may happen that
under collective sanctions, the perpetrators leave, and only those members who remain get
punished – who in fact are innocent, and should not be targets of such sanctions. Such
heterogeneity may therefore further undermine the legitimacy of collective sanctions.
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leaving normative questions to the moral philosophers. This approach, as
seen in Chapter 1’s results, is a bit naive: we found that the perception that a
specific sanctioning mechanism is unfair resulted in lower cooperation rates.
This result has been confirmed in other studies where procedurally unfair
punishment resulted in plummeting cooperation rates (Prooijen, Gallucci,
and Toeset, 2008), or where rules set by an egoistic leader did not have the
same beneficial effect as rules set by a self-sacrificing leader (Mulder and
Nelissen, 2010). Therefore, it is important to see how collective sanctions re-
late to the question of collective responsibility, for it is entirely possible that
sanctions are applied to a group without enough justification that the group
is actually responsible for its actions. 8
In modern ethics, there are two radically opposed points of view with re-
gard to collective sanctions, with a wide range of more moderate opinions in
between. On the one side of the spectrum there is the position of Karl Popper
and methodological individualists who believe that no form of group respon-
sibility is legitimate. Another, less numerous group of scholars believes that
there are situations in which we can hold a group accountable for actions
committed by its members. These scholars base their belief on Durkheim’s
theory of the social act: if there is a social structure – such as a cultural or
social norm – that transcends the individual and can shape his/her behav-
ior, and it is created by the dominant culture in the group, then all members
of this group are responsible for individual actions. Political theorists such
as Hobbes or Rousseau, who have legitimized the subjugation of individual
wills under a collective entity, are also cited by the supporters of collective
responsibility. According to French (1987), a leading philosopher who wrote
extensively on the topic of collective responsibility, there is a class of actions
that can only be done by a group (e.g. to ‘elect’ someone or to ‘chip in for
8A complicating factor is that in telling that a group is responsible, we implicitly assume
that all group members are responsible equally – a question that we will consider further in the
section on the distribution of responsibility and sanctions.
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beer’). Whenever such types of actions result in harmful consequences, each
group member who participated in this action is responsible for it, French
argues. This logic made Karl Jaspers claim that the Germans are collectively
guilty of Nazi (and specifically Hitler’s) crimes (Jaspers, 2009). So, we may
say that collective sanctions are perceived as unfair only if the mechanism
that transfers this guilt to other members is missing. Such mechanisms of
transferal are the act of staying within the group, or the delegation of one’s
will to a wrongdoer.
Often, the survival, safety and well-being of each member depends on
others in a group and on that group’s ability to act collectively. This brings
up another question: Can we ever talk about entirely independent individual
actions – or are all actions, due to group members’ ever-present interdepen-
dence, in fact group-based decisions?
Interdependence
Moral philosophers distinguish between aggregate and conglomerate collec-
tives. Aggregate collectives are just collections of people (e.g. a crowd at a bus
station waiting for the next bus), while a conglomerate is an “organization of
individuals such that its identity is not exhausted by the conjunction of the
identities of the persons in the organization” (French, 1987, p.13). According
to French, then, the degree of group cohesion is crucial for understanding
whether we can or cannot hold a group responsible for its members’ actions.
Not everybody agrees with this position; some claim that there are situations
when disjointed agglomerates of people become collectively responsible due
to inaction, as in the classic case of Kitty Genovese (Rosenthal, 2015). We may
formulate this particular position in terms of interdependence (May, 2006):
if people are deeply dependent on each other in committing individual acts,
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then it is logical enough to suppose that they should be held collectively re-
sponsible for consequences of these individual acts.
Heckathorn (1988) briefly mentions that the more a group is atomized,
the stronger collective sanctions must be in order to be effective. But what if
collective sanctions themselves change the degree of group cohesion, making
a group more consolidated? Again, there is not much research on attitudes
toward group sanctions and interdependence. As a proxy, we can use stud-
ies in management which examine the effect of positive rewards for a team.
As reported in Haines III and Taggar (2006), attitudes toward team-based re-
wards (as compared to individual effort-based rewards) are more positive in
groups with higher degrees of task-interdependence. Other research shows
that when a team is collectively rewarded, that increases the amount of help-
ing behavior between members (Bamberger and Levi, 2009). These findings
suggest that the form of reward – and, perhaps, the form of sanction – can di-
rectly impact group cohesion. However, yet another team of scholars added
a further aspect to this story: they showed that collective rewards increased
the tendency of teams to overstate performance reports (Maas and Van Rin-
sum, 2013). This latter finding is an important hint that collective rewards
and sanctions can also affect the frequency of norm violations and whistle-
blowing in groups.
Distribution
We hold it as given that collective sanctions, if they are presented as an insti-
tutional mechanism, are applied to all members of the group uniformly, or at
least with uniform probability. I began Chapter 2 with the example of Frank
Roque who, in his desperation to retaliate against Muslims, killed an inno-
cent Sikh. It would, however, be an oversimplification to assume most people
perceive such a degree of outgroup entitativity that they are indifferent to the
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death of Bin Laden versus a random Muslim. This brings up the question of
the distribution of sanctions: depending on different distributional schemes,
people may consider outgroup members more or less responsible for the ac-
tions committed by other members of the outgroup. There is a consensus
among moral philosophers that individuals cannot be responsible for group
actions if they openly dissent with these decisions (French, 1987). If we talk
about groups of substantial size, it is logical to assume that a norm violator’s
nearest social neighborhood is considered to hold more responsibility than
outgroup members who are not even acquainted with him. For example, we
may imagine a system where an individual’s closest friends tend to be pun-
ished for that individual’s misdeeds, which may cause that individual to lose
his social links. Depending on the punisher, this may be the desired outcome.
Besides social or physical distance, there are also other criteria to decide
who in a group should be punished for that group’s misdeed. For example,
one common behavior is that an individual is selected for punishment who
is actually able to pay the punishment’s price. Feinberg (1968), in his treatise
on collective responsibility, describes a case similar to the case of Kitty Gen-
ovese. He invites the reader to imagine a situation of a man swimming off a
public beach that lacks a professional life-saver. That man ‘shouts for help in
a voice audible to a group of one thousand accomplished swimmers lolling
on the beach; and yet no one moves to help him, and he is left to drown.’ If
the widow of the drowned man has to choose one swimmer to sue for negli-
gence, Feinberg wonders, whom would she pick? The most logical decision,
from the point of view of rational outcomes, would be to choose the richest
one. This logic, joined with the ability of people to leave a group, can produce
unexpected consequences.
A significant part of microsociology and behavioral economics is dedi-
cated to the study of social dilemmas and the study of ways of reducing the
tension between individual and collective rationality (Kollock, 1998). Since
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late 1950s, there have been hundreds, if not thousands, of studies that use
game-theoretical models and experiments based on these models to examine
how human groups are able to overcome the egoistic desires of individual
members. Some of the mechanisms identified in this research program are
rewards, punishment, selection and the selective exclusion of group mem-
bers (Sally, 1995; Balliet, Mulder, and Van Lange, 2011; Sasaki and Uchida,
2013).
At least for groups that do not pursue criminal goals, higher coopera-
tion levels achieved within a group generally result in positive changes for
society as a whole.9 Thus, the prosperity of individual members is tightly
connected to the prosperity of the group. The opposite is also true: the well-
being of individual members adds up to the wellbeing of the group. That
is why most behavioral studies are focused on finding institutional designs
that are effective in solving social dilemmas. However, our inclination to find
a way to increase group cohesion is not congruous with the impulsive denial
of collective responsibility that is also typical for many social scientists. If the
ability to act collectively increases the chances that individual members of
a group violate external norms with impunity, then the entire group is par-
tially responsible for such actions. Similarly, if the cooperative environment
within a group is directly associated with hostility towards outsiders, then,
yet again, each group member who made his contribution to the creation of
such an environment is somewhat responsible for the adverse actions of his
or her peer.
One does not need to be a social scientist to instinctively understand that
we all owe our existence to the multitudinous groups we belong to, both be-
cause they help us to construct our social identity (Turner and Oakes, 1986)
and because as a biological species, it is just easier to survive within a large
9For example, solidarity is thought to be instrumental in solving issues such as depletion
of scarce resources (Ostrom, 2015).
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cooperative group (Kokko, Johnstone, and Clutton-Brock, 2001). But this folk
wisdom, and reckless adherence to the maxim that ’no man is an island’ can
be drivers of dangerous prejudice and stereotyping against members of other
groups. To prevent this, it is crucial to continue the studies of collective re-
sponsibility and sanctions and to develop a deeper understanding of their
consequences.
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Appendix A
Experimental instructions
After the experiment, your total earnings from the experiment will be paid
out to you anonymously and in cash.
The following pages describe in detail the experiment.
The experiment is divided into different periods. There will be 15 peri-
ods in total. During all 15 periods, the participants are divided into groups
of three. Therefore, you will be in a group with 2 other participants. The
composition of the groups will remain the same during all the experiment.
Each period consists of three stages. In the first stage, you have to de-
cide how many tokens you contribute to a group project. In the second stage,
there is a chance that the contributions to the group project by all group mem-
bers are checked by the computer. If they are, everyones earnings are reduced
if at least one group members contribution is below a specific amount. In
the third stage, you will learn how much the other members of your group
contributed to the project and decide whether to reduce or leave equal the
earnings of each other group members.
A.1 The first stage
At the beginning of each period, each participant in your group receives 20
tokens. We will refer to these tokens as the endowment.
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In the first stage, you decide how to use your endowment. You have
to choose how many tokens you want to contribute to a group project and
how many of them to keep for yourself. You can contribute any amount of
your endowment to the group project. How many tokens you contribute is
up to you. Each other group member will also make such a decision. All
decisions are made simultaneously. That is, nobody will be informed about
the decision of
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. You can earn money
depending on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. How
you can earn money is described in these instructions. It is therefore impor-
tant that you read these instructions carefully.
During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other
participants in any way. If you have any questions please raise your hand.
One of us will come to your table to answer your question. During the ex-
periment, your earnings will be calculated in tokens. At the end of the exper-
iment, the total amount of tokens you have earned will be converted to US
dollars at the following rate:
10tokens = 50cents
the other group members before everyone has made his or her decision.
Your earnings in tokens, in each period, are the sum of two parts:
1. The number of tokens that you have kept for yourself.
2. Your income from the group project. This income is calculated as fol-
lows:
Income from the group project = 0.5 sum of contributions of all group
members to the project Notice that, for each token that you keep for yourself
you earn 1 token. If instead you contribute this token to the group project,
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then the total contribution to the project will go up by one token. Your in-
come from the group project will go up by 0.5 tokens. Moreover, the other
group members? income from the project will also go up by 0.5 tokens. Your
contribution to the group project therefore also increases the income of the
other group members. For each token contributed to the project, the total
earnings of the group will rise by 1.5 tokens. Note that, you also earn tokens
for each token contributed to the group project by the other group members.
For each token contributed by any member, you earn 0.5 tokens.
In summary, your earnings in tokens at the first stage of a period are equal
to:
20 your contribution + 0.5 (sum of contributions)
After everyone has made his or her decision the first stage ends.
A.2 Example for the first stage
Here is an example that illustrates how the earnings in tokens are calculated
in the first stage of each period. The numbers used in the example were
chosen arbitrarily.
You are in a group with two other participants (group member 1 and
group member 2). You contribute 15 tokens to the group project, group mem-
ber 1 contributes 5 tokens, and group member 2 contributes 10 tokens.
• In this case, your earnings equal: 20 15 + 0.5(15 + 5 + 10) = 20 tokens.
• Group member 1s earnings equal: 20 5 + 0.5(15 + 5 + 10) = 30 tokens.
• Group member 2s earnings equal: 20 10 + 0.50(15 + 5 + 10) = 25 to-
kens. The second stage In the second stage, there is a 33% chance that
the contributions of everyone in your group are checked by a computer.
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Specifically, every period the computer generates a random number be-
tween 1 and 100 for each group. If the generated number equals 33 or
less then it checks the contributions of all group members in that group.
– If your groups contributions are checked and the contribution of
at least one group member is found to be 10 tokens or less, then
the earnings of everyone in the group in that period are reduced
by 7 tokens.
– If your groups contributions are checked and the contribution of
each of the members in your group is found to be 11 tokens or
more, then the earnings of everyone in the group remain the same.
– If your groups contributions are not checked then the earnings of
everyone in the group remain the same. Example for the second
stage As in the previous example, you are in a group with two
other participants (group member 1 and group member 2). In the
first stage, you contribute 15 tokens to the group project, group
member 1 contributes 5 tokens, and group member 2 contributes
10 tokens. At the end of the first stage the earnings of your group
members are as follows:
∗ Your earnings are: 20 tokens
∗ Group member 1s earnings: 30 tokens
∗ Group member 2s earnings: 25 tokens.
If the generated number in this period is 25 then the computer checks the
contributions and the earnings for the second stage equal:
• Your earnings are: 20 7 = 13 tokens
• Group member 1s earnings: 30 7 = 23 tokens
• Group member 2s earnings: 25 7 = 18 tokens. The third stage At the
beginning of the third stage, everyone in the group will see how much
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each of the other group members contributed to the project, whether
the group was checked by a computer or not, and their earnings at the
end of the second stage. The decision each group member has to make
in the third stage is to either reduce or leave equal the earnings of each
other group member. The other group members can also reduce your
earnings if they wish to. All decisions are made simultaneously. That
is, nobody will be informed about the decision of the other group mem-
bers before everyone made his or her decision. More concisely, in this
stage you must decide how many deduction points you want to allo-
cate to each of the other two group members. For each deduction point
that you allocate to another group member, his or her earnings are re-
duced by 2 tokens and your own earnings are reduced by 1 token. If
you do not wish to change the earnings of another group member then
you must allocate 0 deduction 21 points to him or her. Each participant
can allocate up to 10 deduction points on each group member in each
period. After everyone has made a decision, you will be informed how
many deduction points the other group members allocated to you and
what your total earnings for that period are. Note that you will only be
informed of the total amount of deduction points allocated by the other
two group members. You will not know how many deduction points
each individual group member allocated to you.
In summary, your earnings in tokens at the third stage of a period are
equal to:
Second stage earnings ?2× deduction points others allocated to you ? de-
duction points you allocated
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A.3 Example for the third stage
Here is an example that illustrates how your earnings are calculated in the
third stage.
You are in a group with two other participants (group member 1 and
group member 2). Suppose that after the second stage you have earnings
that are equal to 30 tokens. In the second stage you decide to allocate 3 de-
duction points to group member 1 (this reduces group member 1?s earnings
by 6 tokens) and 0 deduction points to group member 2 (this does not change
group member 2?s earnings). After all have made their decision, you learn
that the others allocated you a total of 4 deduction points. Your total earnings
in tokens in this period are then equal to: 30?2× 4?3 = 19 tokens.
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Screenshots of an Experiment in
CELSS
(see separate pages below)
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Appendix C
Lab Instructions
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please take
your time to read through the following instructions thoroughly. You can
take notes if you so wish.
In this study you will earn some money. As a participant you will be
asked to make certain decisions, and to complete a brief questionnaire. There
are no right or wrong decisions in this experiment. You will each receive a
show-up fee of 100 Rs, and you will earn an additional amount of money.
This could be between 100 Rs and 300 Rs, depending on the decisions that
you and others make. You will be paid at the end of the workshop.
Participation in this study is voluntary. After the details of the study have
been explained to you, you may decline to participate if you so wish. How-
ever please note that if you choose not participate, you will receive only your
show-up fee.
All the decisions you make and information you provide will be treated as
confidential. Your name will not be included or in any other way associated
with the data collected in the study. All the monetary amounts mentioned
below are Indian rupees. At the end of the experiment your earnings will be
paid in cash. Instructions for ‘Collective Punishment’ treatment (p=10%)
In these experiments the participants earn real money. At the end of each
round you can see at the screen how much you earned – in rupees.
138 Appendix C. Lab Instructions
At the end of this session you will receive the show-up fee of 100 rupees
plus the amount you earned during the experiment. We will also ask you
to fill in a short questionnaire. We will ask you to provide your name and
surname in order to know what amount to pay you at the end.
The experiment consists of twenty small rounds. Each round lasts from
30 seconds to one minute depending on how fast you and other participants
will make the decisions. In total the experiment will not take more than one
hour of your time including the questionnaire and payment.
In each round you will be a part of a group of two. In every round you
will be with a different person (your co-participant will change).
You will not know with whom you are in the group each round. The
study is completely anonymous. In every round you will see the screen with
20 envelopes of two different colors: 10 blue and 10 green. [The Picture 1 is
shown – see below]
You should choose one of the envelopes by clicking on the one you have
chosen and then pressing OK. Unless you have not clicked ‘OK’ button you
can change your mind by clicking another envelope of your choice. We do
not limit you in decision making - please take your time.
In each blue envelope there are 10 rupees.
In 9 out of 10 green envelopes there are 25 rupees.
In 1 out of 10 green envelopes there are 0 rupees1.
These empty envelopes are random each round.
We have a certain amount of money that we will send to a charity organi-
zation in India after the experiment2. Each time someone of you chooses the
1In a treatment with p=30% these two sentences were changed to:
“In 7 out of 10 green envelopes there are 25 rupees.
In 3 out of 10 green envelopes there are 0 rupees."
2Later on participants were informed about the details of a charity organization. That was
“Community Service Initiative – Prayyas", supported by Indian Institute of Management
– Ahmedabad. See details at: http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/institute/campus/student-
activities/clubs/prayaas.html
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green envelope the amount we send to the charity organization will diminish
by 15 rupees.
Each time you chooses the green envelope and it turns out to be empty
the earnings of your partner will diminish by 10 rupees3.
So each time your partner chooses the green envelope and it turns out to
be empty, your earnings will diminish by 10 rupees.
You and your partner-participant have made your decisions on which
envelope to choose. Then at the next screen both of you can “catch" the
other participant for his/her potential choice of the green envelope making
it “empty". But it will cost you 5 rupees (the second participant can make the
same with you).
If the other participant chose the empty green envelope and you choose
the option “Make the green envelope of your partner empty", your earnings
will not diminish by 10 rupees (but the “emptying" will cost you 5 rupees).
If you choose the option “Make the green envelope of your partner empty"
and the other participant chose the non-empty green envelope, he will get 0
rupees (but the “emptying" will cost you 5 rupees).
If the other participant chose the blue envelope and you choose the option
“Make the green envelope of your partner empty", the “emptying" will not
cost you 5 rupees and your partner receives what is due to him.
3In Individual Punishment treatment this and the next sentences were omitted.
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Appendix D
Sessions
TABLE D.1: Table D1
Date Time N Treatment P
Jan 29 5pm 18 IP-CP 0.1
Jan 29 7pm 18 IP-CP 0.1
Feb 2 5pm 14 CP-IP 0.1
Feb 2 7pm 8 CP-IP 0.1
Feb 3 6pm 14 CP-IP 0.3
Feb 3 7:30pm 8 IP-CP 0.3
Feb 10 4pm 16 CP 0.3
Feb 10 7pm 12 IP 0.3
Feb 12 4pm 8 CP 0.3
Feb 12 6pm 20 IP 0.3
Feb 12 7pm 12 CP 0.3
Feb 13 4pm 12 IP 0.3
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Answers to some
post-experimental questions
If there would be LESS empty green envelopes, would you take them MORE often?
(%)
TABLE E.1: Table E1
Individual Sanctions Collective Sanctions Total
Yes 50 58.3 53.7
No 50.1 41.6 46.2
If there would be LESS empty green envelopes, would you make other people’s
envelope empty LESS often?
TABLE E.2: Table E2
Individual Sanctions Collective Sanctions Total
No 65.9 63.9 65.0
Yes 34.1 36.1 35.0
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In the cases when you decided NOT to take green envelope, what were the reasons
for it (1– less important, 5 – more important)? (Standard errors in parentheses)
TABLE E.3: Table E3
Individual Sanctions Collective Sanctions
Taking green envelope takes 3.7 3.3
money from charity (.2) (0.25)
Green envelope can be empty 2.7 2.9
(.21) (.23)
Another participant can 2.6 2.8
make envelope empty (.21) (.24)
In the cases when you decided NOT to EMPTY an envelope of another participant,
what were the reasons for it (from more to less important)?
TABLE E.4: Table E4
Individual Sanctions Collective Sanctions
Emptying envelope was too costly 2.9 3.1
(.21) (0.23)
It is bad to punish other people 3.7 2.8
without sufficient reason (.19) (.26)
If I do it someone else can 2.3 2.9
‘empty’ my envelope as well (.21) (.28)
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 26 
Waiting page 
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F.3 Stage 1 Decision
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FIGURE F.4: Stage 2 Decision
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F.5 Stage 1 Instructions
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Instructions - Stage 1 
Time left to complete this page:  4:48 
There are two stages in this study: 
General Rules 
In this game there are six participants. Each participant is randomly assigned to a group of three. There are 
two groups: A and B, with three participants in each group. 
In each round every participant from the group A is matched with a random participant from the group B. They 
then play a game, in which both of them should take a decision that is described below. 
You have been assigned to the group B. 
In each round you are matched with one random participant from group A. 
The experiment consists of 20 identical rounds. 
Stage 1: 
In each round you are given 10 points and you have an option to transfer some of these points or all of them 
to the other participant, with whom you are matched, or leave all the points to yourself. The amount of points you decide 
to transfer to the other participant will be multiplied by 2  and earned by the other participant. Simultaneously the other 
participant will be given exactly the same choice. 
For instance: 
• If you both transfer all the points you get, each of you will get 20 points. 
• If you transfer everything and the other participant keeps everything, then you will earn nothing and the other 
participant will earn 30. 
• If you keep everything and the other participant transfers everything, then you will get 30 points and your 
partner will earn nothing. 
Payoffs 
In the end of the experiment your earnings will be calculate as follows: 
You will get a participation fee of $0.25. 
In addition all your payoffs in all 20 rounds will be summed up and converted in US dollars at the exchange 
rate of: 
200 points = 1 US dollar. 
  
FIGURE F.5: Stage 1 Instructions
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 30 
Instructions - Stage 2 
In each round in Stage 2 you again have an endowment of 10 points. 
In this stage you can see the decisions and thus payoffs of another pair of participants in the 
same game, i.e. of a random member of your own group and a member of the other group, with whom 
the member of your group was matched. After seeing the results of their game, you can transfer points 
from your endowment to decrease the income of the participants. By transferring 1 point from your 
endowment you decrease the income of another participant by 3 points. While in your own group your 
action decreases the payoff of the specific participant, whose decisions you have just seen, in the 
other group your action will affect a random participant of the other group. 
You can not send more than 10 points to both participants in total. 
Other members of both groups can make the same decisions about other participants. When 
you make your decision in Stage 2 and click ‘Next’, you will be shown your own and your partner’s 
decisions made in Stage 1 and your payoffs for this round. 
These instructions remain available to you at the later stages of the experiment. 
 	FIGURE F.6: Stage 2 Instructions
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